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Abstract 
This dissertation consists of two essays: one looks at the relation between firm focus and 
hedging in the REIT industry, and the other compares bank board structures in China and the US. 
The first essay presented in Chapter 2 examines the relation between corporate hedging 
and firm focus in the REIT industry by using a sample of REITs in 2005 and in 2007. We find 
46.41% utilization rate in 2005 and 43.41% in 2007. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that, 
relative to diversified firms, focused firms are more likely to engage in hedging. Focused firms 
also tend to be involved in greater amount of hedging. We also document a negative relation 
between hedging and transparency, although the evidence is not overwhelming. Consistent with 
previous literature, there is a strong firm size effect.  
The second essay presented in Chapter 3 examines the relation between bank 
performance and board structure by using a sample of 74 US banks and 53 Chinese banks for the 
period 2002 to 2006. Indeed, the empirical relation between board structure and performance is 
virtually non-existing in China. In particular, for the US sample, the board size is found to be 
significantly and negatively correlated with ROA, but a larger board also tends to be associated 
with lower costs. For Chinese banks, the evidence indicates that governance variables are not 
significantly correlated with performances with the exception of block ownership: there is strong 
evidence that the relation between block ownership and bank performance is negative. 
Additionally, we find substantial differences in board structure between the two countries; in 
particular the average board size and the proportion of outside directors for US banks are almost 
twice of those in China. 
Keywords: Corporate hedging, firm focus, transparency, board structure, bank 
performance, ownership.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
This dissertation consists of two essays: one looks at the relation between firm focus and 
hedging in the REIT industry, and the other compares bank board structures in China and the US. 
The first essay is presented in Chapter. In this study, we examine the use of derivatives in 
the REIT industry. We find 46.41% utilization rate in 2005 and 43.41% in 2007. Consistent with 
our hypothesis, we find that, relative to diversified firms, focused firms are more likely to engage 
in hedging. Focused firms also tend to be involved in greater amount of hedging. However, the 
evidence is not strong because not all measures of firm focus are statistically significant.  
Also consistent with our expectation and with DeMarzo and Duffie (1995), we document 
a negative relation between hedging and transparency. This result is sensible because managers 
in less transparent firms arguably have greater incentive to smooth incomes, thus conveying their 
abilities with less noise to investors. However, the evidence is also weak, since the univariate 
comparison between hedgers and non-hedgers does not indicate a significant difference in firm.  
Our results support a firm size effect that is consistent with previous literature. Namely, 
larger REITs are more likely to hedge, but their hedge amounts tend to be smaller (relative to 
their assets) than their smaller counterparts. A possible explanation is as follows: larger firms 
tend to hedge due to economies of scale in entry costs or execution costs, but they hedge smaller 
amounts because they are less likely to be in financial distress. 
The second essay presented in Chapter 3 examines the relationship between board 
governance and performance using a sample of 74 banks in US and 53 banks in China for the 
period from 2002 to 2006.  
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We find substantial differences in board structure between the two countries; in particular 
the average board size and the proportion of outside directors for US banks are almost twice of 
those in China. US banks also perform much better than Chinese banks during our sample period. 
As for the relation between performance and governance, the evidence is fairly mixed for the US 
sample while insignificant for the Chinese sample. In particular, in the US sample, board size is 
found to be significantly and negatively associated with ROA, but a larger board also tends to 
reduce costs. We cannot identify a satisfactory explanation to reconcile the results for ROA and 
costs. Regarding Chinese banks, the evidence indicates that governance variables are not 
significantly correlated with performances with the exception of block ownership; there is strong 
evidence that block ownership is negatively related to performance. In China, block ownership is 
often government ownership. Therefore, the overall evidence is consistent with our conjecture 
that the role of board governance structure is of secondary importance in Chinese banks, perhaps 
due to the strong role of government.    
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Chapter 2 
Corporate Hedging and Firm Focus: 
The Case of REITs 
 
Abstract 
 
In this study, we examine the relation between corporate hedging and firm focus in the 
REIT industry. The REIT industry is suitable for the investigation for various reasons, with the 
primary one being that the tax codes of REITs restrict their abilities to use derivatives for 
speculative purposes. We find 46.41% utilization rate in 2005 and 43.41% in 2007. Consistent 
with our hypothesis, we find that, relative to diversified firms, focused firms are more likely to 
engage in hedging. Focused firms also tend to be involved in greater amount of hedging. 
However, the evidence is not strong because not all measures of firm focus are statistically 
significant. We also document a negative relation between hedging and transparency, although 
the evidence is not overwhelming. Consistent with previous literature, we find a firm size effect. 
Namely, larger REITs are more likely to hedge, but their hedge amounts tend to be smaller 
(relative to their assets) than their smaller counterparts.  
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1.  Introduction 
Recent financial crisis points to the need to further study the role of corporate hedging.  
Particularly, it seems puzzling that given the widespread use of derivatives, the financial 
performance has remained volatile and the risk control of corporations and institutions does not 
appear to be ideal, to say the least.  This begs the question: do firms utilize hedging in a sensible 
way? Therefore, it is useful to study further corporate hedging practice. However, given the 
complexity and variety of the derivative instruments, techniques, and markets, we choose to 
concentrate on just one aspect of hedging: the substitutability of hedging and diversification.  
Conceptually, a firm can reduce its risk either by diversification or by hedging.  Conventional 
wisdom thus suggests that more focused firms would tend to be more active users of hedging.  
This point has been suggested elsewhere. For example, in his widely popular book on derivatives, 
Hull (2008, p. 48) states that ―the arguments in favor of hedging are so obvious that they hardly 
need to be stated. Most companies are in the business of manufacturing, or retailing or 
wholesaling, or providing a service.  They have no particular skills or expertise in predicting 
variables such as interest rates, exchange rates, and commodity prices. It makes sense for them to 
hedge the risks associated with these variables as they arise.  The companies can then focus on 
their main activities – for which presumably they do have particular skills and expertise.  By 
hedging, they avoid unpleasant surprises such as sharp rise in the price of a commodity that is 
being purchased.‖ This study attempts to analyze the relation between firm hedging and firm 
focus. 
Surprisingly to our knowledge, no study has examined the connection between the two. 
Therefore, this paper represents an early attempt to examine the relation between hedging and 
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firm focus. We hypothesize that, relative to diversified firms, focused firms are more likely to be 
associated with hedging, reducing the effects of factors that are beyond their control
1
.   
An important confounding factor in empirical research is that some evidence suggests 
derivatives were sometimes used for speculation. As an example in the Wharton’s survey of 
derivatives usage, Bodnar et al (1995) find that 34% of derivatives users sometimes use them to 
―reduce funding costs by expressing a view‖.  Extreme losses from some corporations and 
financial institutions further suggest that the speculative use of derivatives is not uncommon. 
Ljungqvist (1992) demonstrates that managers with private information will engage in 
speculation instead of hedging. Moreover, Geczy et al. (2007) find a substantial portion of firms 
engaged in using derivatives for speculation. Primarily for this reason, we utilize the sample of 
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) to minimize speculation for this study.  The REIT 
industry is suitable for this investigation because the tax codes restrict their use of derivatives for 
speculation, and therefore their use of derivative should be predominantly intended for hedging. 
The tax codes for REITs stipulate that no more than 25% of REITs’ incomes may come from 
short-term capital gains and unrelated businesses. Moreover, a REIT must invest at least 75% of 
its total assets in its core business: real estate.  
The investigation into this industry has other advantages. First, because REITs pay no 
corporate income tax, tax-motivated hedging is unlikely. Moreover, Capozza and Sequin (1998) 
show that REITs’ expenses reflect primarily the cost of management team.  This allows us to 
examine whether management cost is a consideration in hedging activities. The REIT industry 
uses derivatives quite frequently. Horng and Wei (1999) find that 41% of REITs in their sample 
make use of derivatives and that most of them use interest rate swaps and other interest rate 
                                                 
1
 The causality of hedging and focus may be two-ways. However, analyzing causality requires high frequency data, 
which is not available. Therefore, in this study, we concentrate on the correlation between the two. 
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derivatives; the use of currency derivatives is non-existing in this industry. In contrast, Mian 
(1996) indicates that many industries simultaneously use interest-rate derivatives, currency 
derivatives and commodity derivatives. To the extent motivations for employing interest rate 
derivatives and other types of derivatives are different; the results of the study would have 
clearer implications for the motivations to use interest rate derivatives. Focusing on one industry 
has the additional advantage of allowing us to include more detailed data and smaller firms. For 
the most part, data on hedging activities can only be obtained by reading annual reports. Finally, 
the REIT industry is relatively homogeneous; presumably a REIT can only diversify by 
geographic regions or by real estate subsectors such as apartments and shopping malls. 
Information for both types of diversification is obtainable and measureable
2
.     
In the following section, we review the related literature, which is followed by the third 
section that describes the methodology and the data. Section four discusses the empirical results, 
and section five concludes.  
 
2. Literature Review 
In section 2.1, we first review the theories on motivations for hedging, followed by 
related empirical studies in 2.2.  Then some representative studies on firm focus are discussed in 
section 2.3. Finally, section 2.4 gives a brief background of the REIT industry. 
 
2.1 Theories on Hedging Motivations  
In a perfect market with homogeneous transaction costs, the use of derivatives should not 
increase firm value, since shareholders can trade derivatives with the same cost as firms. Mayers 
                                                 
2
 In contrast, it would be difficult to compare the focus of, say, two technology firms for which the technology 
products differ substantially in terms of their potential uses.  
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and Smith (1982) and Smith and Stulz (1985) view derivatives use as motivated by market 
imperfections, including progressivity of taxes, financial distress costs, and agency problems. 
This is so because derivatives use can reduce income volatility, thereby lowering expected taxes, 
financial distress costs, and conflicts of interests between shareholders and debt-holders.  
Hedging can be used to resolve agency problems such as the underinvestment problem 
suggested by Myers (1977).  Myers (1977) and Bessembinder (1991) argue that if most of the 
gains that accrue from positive net present value projects were distributed to debt-holders, 
shareholders might not be willing to take on such projects. To avoid this problem, a firm needs to 
make its debt-holders feel more secure about debt payments by having lower volatility in the 
firm’s earnings. Hence, hedging is suggested by Stulz (1990) and Smith and Stulz (1985) to be 
able to control the underinvestment problem and increase firm value. These studies also argue 
that if managerial self-interests are important in the decision to hedge, managers with larger 
stock holdings will be more inclined to hedge. Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) present a 
theoretical model with costly external financing. A firm having valuable growth opportunities 
will likely to hedge more to reduce its reliance on external financing.  DeMarzo and Duffie 
(1995) and Breeden and Viswanathan (1998) hypothesize that managers will hedge to reduce 
income volatility, thus conveying their abilities with less noise to shareholders. An implication of 
their theory is that the greater the information asymmetry faced by a firm, the greater the benefits 
shareholders receive from hedging (Geczy, Minton and Schrand, 1997). Dadalt et al. (2002) 
exam the effect of the use of currency and interest rate derivatives on the extent of information 
asymmetry facing the firm, and they suggest that derivatives usage is associated with reductions 
in the level of information asymmetry between managers of the firm and outsiders.     
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There are additional theories that are relevant for interest-rate swaps only. For example, a 
firm might be inclined to undertake riskier projects when its debt amount increases. A firm that 
borrows short-term floating-rate debt and swaps into fixed-rate debt can reduce this asset 
substitution problem (Wall, 1989). Titman (1992) argues that a firm facing information 
asymmetry and expecting performance improvement also can benefit from borrowing floating-
rate and swapping into fixed-rate payments. This is because the swap would allow the firm to 
lower its default premium in the future when performance improves while keeping the default-
free interest payments fixed. Li and Mao (2003) present a theory explaining the existence of 
interest-rate swaps. A firm facing substantial information asymmetry would prefer private bank 
debt to public debt. However, since banks prefer to lend floating-rate loans, a firm that chooses a 
bank loan will face interest-rate risk.  By swapping the floating-rate debt into fixed-rate debt, the 
firm can avoid interest-rate risk as well as a higher rate (due to information asymmetry) in public 
debt. They further argue that firms with little default risk can handle interest-rate risk better than 
banks, thus explaining Gortons and Rosen’s (1995) finding that few banks engage in interest-rate 
swaps. The implications are that good firms would tend to borrow bank debt or floating-rate 
loans and swap the debt into fixed-rate instruments. Superior firms without default risk would 
take the opposite side (i.e., swap their debt from fixed-rate into floating-rate). 
 
2.2 Empirical Testing on Hedging Motivations  
Block and Gallagher (1986) survey corporate hedging via forwards, futures, options and 
swaps.  Their main conclusion is that larger firms use interest-rate derivatives more extensively 
than smaller firms.  In a study of interest-rate swaps, Wall and Pringler (1989) find weak 
evidence supporting various theories for interest-rate swaps.  Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) 
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investigate the hedging activities of 169 firms among the Fortune 500 and S &P 400, and find 
that 104 firms used hedging instruments in the fiscal year 1986.  Three possible substitutes for 
hedging – convertible debt and preferred stock, cash reserves, and dividend yields – are also 
incorporated in their study.  Their results indicate that firms’ hedging decisions are related to the 
investment tax credit but are unrelated to proxies for financial-distress costs and agency costs. 
Howton and Perfect (1998) survey firms included in Fortune 500 and S&P 500, and find that 
over 61% of them use derivatives. Geczy et al. (2007) report survey findings that indicate that 61 
out of 186 firms sometimes speculate and 13 frequently speculate. In contrast, a random sample 
of firms shows that 36% use derivatives. Their findings suggest that larger firms have a greater 
tendency to use derivatives. The above studies use survey data, which may have a response bias. 
The Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (FASB) 105 requires firms to disclose their use 
of derivatives in financial statement footnotes for statements ending after June 15, 1990.  Several 
studies that use non-survey data thus followed.  
Using a sample of 3,022 firms, Mian (1996) provides empirical evidence of the 
determinants of corporate hedging policy.  He classifies firms into 771 hedgers and 2,251 non-
hedges using 1992 annual financial statements (a 25.5% utilization rate). Overall evidence for 
the underinvestment problem and the tax-based motivation is mixed.  For example, he finds the 
ratio of market value to book value of assets, a proxy for growth opportunities, to be negatively 
related to the probability of hedging, a result opposite to what the underinvestment hypothesis 
predicts. With a sample of 116 firms listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange, Berkman and 
Bradbury (1996) provide evidence that supports most existing theories. They find that 
derivatives use increases with leverage, firm size, the existence of tax losses and the proportion 
of shares held by managers. Moreover, the use of derivatives decreases with increasing interest 
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coverage and liquidity. Geczy et al. (1997) investigate 372 of the Fortune 500 non-financial 
firms that have potential exposure to foreign-currency risk and they find a 41.4% usage rate in 
1991. Their results indicate that firms with a combination of high growth opportunities and low 
access to both internal and external financing use currency derivatives extensively. They find 
little support for the explanations based on tax, asymmetry information, and managerial self-
interest.  
Samant (1996) examines the use of interest-rate swaps. He finds that firms with more 
growth opportunities, lower ratios of fixed assets to total assets, and more divergent earnings 
forecasts tend to use swaps. He interprets the results as evidence consistent with hedging being 
motivated by underinvestment, asset substitution, and information asymmetry problems.  
More recent empirical studies point to a strong influence of managerial self-interest on 
hedging decisions. For example, Spano (2007) analyzes a sample of UK firms and finds that 
managerial risk aversion tends to produce a hedging scheme that deviates from the optimal one. 
Similarly, Hagelin, Holmen, Knopf and Pramborg (2007) conduct a survey on Swedish firms and 
conclude that when hedging is linked to managerial incentives, firm value decreases. 
There are a few studies that investigate a single industry, and arguably they are the most 
relevant to this study. Tufano (1996) examines corporate risk management activity of the North 
American gold mining industry. The main findings are that managers who own a large number of 
shares of stock are likely to hedge, but those who hold more options are less likely to hedge. He 
suggests that this is consistent with the notion of managerial self-serving behavior. No strong 
relationship between hedging and other determinants of hedging is found. Haushalter (2000) 
examines the hedging activities of the oil and gas producers. On hundred firms responded (out of 
the 177 public of oil and gas producers), and approximately 50 are hedgers. The results of his 
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study indicate that firms facing financial constraints tend to hedge more aggressively. The 
differences in results between these two studies suggest that motivations to use derivatives vary 
across industries. This means that the results in our study may not be generalized to industries 
other than REITs.  Nevertheless, as discussed earlier, the unique characteristics of the REIT 
industry might provide insightful or clearer results. 
Haushalter (2000) also separates the analyses of the probability of hedging and the 
amount of hedging. He finds ―important differences between the decision to hedge and the 
decision of how much to hedge.‖  In particular, he shows that the probability of hedging is 
positively related to firm size, while the level of hedging is negatively related to firm size. In 
most of the empirical studies, firm size is used as one potential determinant of hedging decisions, 
yet the interpretation is not clear. Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) argue that firm size may be 
a proxy for direct financial distress costs and tax effects.  Smaller firms are expected to hedge 
more, since they generally have proportionally higher direct bankruptcy costs (Warner, 1977) 
and are in the progressive region of the tax schedule.  Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) argue 
that smaller firms are likely to face greater information asymmetry, and hence hedge more, based 
on the theory of DeMarzo and Duffie (1995). On the other hand, larger firms tend to have 
economics of scale in information costs and transaction costs, implying that larger firms should 
be more inclined to hedge. Haushalter’s (2000) results suggest that while economics of scale in 
transaction and information costs are key factors in firms’ decisions to hedge, financial-distress 
costs, taxes, and information asymmetry are factors affecting the amount of hedging.  
There are two studies that utilize the REIT sample. Horng and Wei (1999) analyze 235 
REITs and find that 41% of REITs use interest rate derivatives, although the amount of 
derivatives on average is not high.  Larger and mortgage REITs are more likely to use 
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derivatives. However, in terms of the amount of derivatives, smaller and more levered REITs 
tend to use more. They interpret that the results are evidence consistent with considerable entry 
costs, and consistent with financial distress costs being an important motive for hedging. 
Additional analysis on the relation between interest rate risk and hedging reveals an interesting 
pattern: mortgage REITs tend to increase their hedging when interest rates decline, while the 
opposite is true for equity REITs. They interpret the results as evidence consistent with 
prepayment risk being an important concern for mortgage REITs, while equity REITs primarily 
hedge to control financing costs.  Ertugrul, Sezer, and Sirmans (2008) also analyze the REIT 
industry but look at a more recent time period: 1999 to 2001. They find results similar to those in 
Horng and Wei; moreover, they find evidence linking managerial compensations and hedging 
decisions.  
 
2.3 Firm Focus and Firm Value  
In recent years, the potential benefits of corporate focus have received widespread 
coverage in the academic literature. Conglomerate diversification might insulate managers from 
market discipline, and as a result, internal politics might induce management to misallocate 
resources between divisions. More diversified firms may also be hard to evaluate and are subject 
to a greater degree of information asymmetry. Montgomery (1994) summarizes some literature 
and concludes that firms that are less focused or more diversified either under-perform or 
perform as well as their more focused, less diversified counterparts. Berger and Ofek (1995) 
conclude that diversification results in a 13% to 15% firm value loss. Comment and Jarrell (1995) 
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examine the relation between changes in focus
3
 and stock returns; they discover co-movement 
between focus and shareholder wealth.   
A possible reason for the underperformance of diversification is that diversified firms 
suffer greater asymmetric information because segment reporting may be relatively 
uninformative.  Even if valuation errors can be partially diversified away, if each segment is 
harder to value because segment reporting is not informative, the diversified firm will suffer 
greater information-based valuation problems. Nanda and Narayanan (1999) present a model 
suggesting the existence of increased information asymmetries in diversified firms.  For 
empirical support, Capozza and Sequin (1999) attribute the diversification discount they observe 
for REITs to diversification-induced illiquidity.  Moreover, Krishnaswami and Subramaniam 
(1999) find that spin-offs improve the liquidity of parent firms.  
However, Thomas (2002) finds that diversified firms have smaller levels of information 
asymmetry than stand-alone firms based on analyst forecast data and returns around earnings 
announcements. Likewise, Hadlock, Ryngaert, and Thomas (2001) find that equity issuances by 
diversified firms are associated with less negative abnormal returns than those of focused firms, 
suggesting that diversified firms enjoy lower adverse selection risk. Finally, Clarke, Fee, and 
Thomas (2004) show that diversified firms have lower levels of asymmetric information, as 
measured by various microstructure liquidity metrics, compared to the inferred liquidity metrics 
of portfolios constructed from focused firms.  
 There are a few studies that analyze diversification effects within the real estate industry. 
Capozza and Seguin (1999) examine the effects of diversification within the REIT segment and 
find that diversification reduces firm value even though it does not reduce firm cash flow. Their 
explanation is that the observed diversification discount arises from investors imposing a higher 
                                                 
3
 Measured by year-to-year changes in asset-based Herfindahl indices. 
14 
 
required return on diversified REITs; in other words, they suggest that firm focus affects firm 
value indirectly through liquidity. 
In sum, previous literature generally examines the performance effect of focus, and we 
are unaware of any study linking firm focus to corporate hedging behavior -- an important 
objective of this study. 
 
2.4 Some Background on the REIT Industry 
REITs’ asset structures differ substantially between equity REITs and mortgage REITs; 
the former primarily invest in real estate properties such as shopping malls, apartments, and 
commercial buildings, while the latter invest primarily in mortgage securities.  Equity REITs are 
expected to use derivatives mainly to hedge financing cost, since their assets lack suitable 
hedging instruments. For the mortgage REITs that have substantial gaps between the durations of 
assets and debt, hedging can be used to provide better maturity matching.   
The industry has a long history, but significant growth started only after 1990s. Riding 
the tides in the underlying real estate market, the industry has been growing rapidly since 2000, 
but is facing substantial downturn during the recent housing meltdown. Also during this period, 
the relative importance of equity REITs has increased considerably, while mortgage REITs have 
declined both in terms of the number of firms and relative size. On the relationship between 
types of REITs and interest rate risk hedging, Horng and Wei (1999) find that the hedging 
activities of mortgage and equity REITs differ substantially when interest rates decrease. 
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3. Hypotheses, Data and Methodology  
3.1 Hypotheses 
As mentioned earlier, we hypothesize that, relative to diversified firms, focused firms are 
more likely to be associated with hedging. Put differently, focused firms are more likely to 
employ hedging to reduce the effects of factors that are beyond their control, such as interest 
rates, exchange rates, and commodity prices. 
 
3.2 Data and Methodology 
Following Horng and Wei (1999) and Haushalter (2000), we perform separate analyses 
on the probability of hedging and the level of hedging.  
The initial sample consists of 237 REITs in 2005 and 189 REITs in 2007 included in the 
COMPUSTAT. The year 2005 is a relatively good year for the real estate market while 2007 is 
relatively poor. The data about hedging and firm focus comes from reading of annual reports 
(from Security Exchange Commission website (www.sec.com), which is time-consuming and is 
the reason for limiting the data to two years. In estimating R
2
, a proxy for firm transparency, we 
utilize the return data in CRSP.  Data for other variables (management costs, leverage ratio, 
market-to-book and their substitutes) come from the Compustat, and we also use the information 
on types of REITs from the website of National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(www.nareit.com). Due to missing data, the final numbers of all REITs with available data are 
153 in 2005 and 127 in 2007. 
  To assess the probability of hedging, a logistic regression approach is used.  The 
dependent variable is a dummy variable, with a value of one for REITs that hedge and zero 
otherwise. The explanatory variables are firm focus, management costs, and control variables 
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used in Horng and Wei (1999), including firm size, leverage ratio, and types of REITs (equity or 
mortgage)
4
. A detailed description of the variables will be given below; Table 1 also summaries 
the variables and their data sources. The regression is estimated by the maximum-likelihood 
method
5
. 
As discussed earlier, we expect a positive coefficient for more focused firms and less 
transparent firms. With regard to the coefficient of management costs, it should be negative if 
management cost is of major concern in executing hedging scheme.  
Since firm focus is of major importance to the study, two alternative measures of firm 
focus are used: Herfindahl indices based on product lines (property types) and geographic 
locations. They are described next.  
The first, Focus/Type, is computed as 
4
1
2
t
tS where St is the proportion of a firm’s 
assets invested in each of four real estate types: office, warehouse, retail, or apartment. Higher 
levels of concentration by property type lead to higher levels of the index.  If the firm is highly 
focused along one dimension, the index is close to one; while the index approaches .25, if the 
firm’s portfolio of properties is equally distributed across the four property types.  
The second, Focus/Region  
8
1
2
r
rS  is computed the same way but Sr is the proportion 
of a firm’s assets invested in each of eight real estate regions: New England, Middle Atlantic, 
Southeast, Midwest, Plains, Southwest, South Pacific, and North Pacific. As with the first focus 
measure, this concentration variable can vary from one for a geographically focused REIT, to 
0.125 for a REIT with holdings equally divided across regions.  
 
                                                 
4
 The independent variables include no tax variable, since the tax explanation for hedging is irrelevant for REITs. 
5
 The analysis is repeated using Probit regression and the results are qualitatively the same. 
17 
 
 
Table 1: Data Descriptions and  Sources 
 Variable Variables Descriptions Sources 
Dependent Variable www.sec.com 
(Financial Reports 
10-K) 
HedgeProb 
 
A dummy variable: 1 for REITs that hedge and 0 otherwise 
 
HedgeLevel 
 
The notional amount of interest-rate derivatives over 
Market value of assets 
 
Independent Variable 
 Firm Focus: 
  Focus/Type 
 
 
4
1
2
t
tS
 
where St is the proportion of a firm’s assets invested in each of 
four real estate types: office, warehouse, retail, or apartment. 
  
Focus/Region 
 
 
 
 
8
1
2
r
rS
 where Sr is the proportion of a firm’s assets invested in each of 
eight real estate regions: New England, Middle Atlantic, Southeast, 
Midwest, Plains, Southwest, South Pacific, and North Pacific. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CRSP 
 
Agency Costs: 
R
2
 Stock returns' R
2
 
M/B Market value of assets/Book value of assets 
SELF A dummy variable: 1 for self-administered REITs Compustat 
INST The proportion of shares held by institutions 
 
Control Variable: 
 Firm Size: 
  SZ The log of market value of assets 
Leverage: 
  DEBT Book value of debt/market value of assets 
COV Pre-tax income/Interest 
 RATING A dummy variable: 1 if bond rating is BBB or better 
Substitutes/Liquidity: 
 CASH Cash Balance/market value of assets 
SUBS 
 
Value of preferred stock and convertible bonds 
Over Market value of assets 
REIT type: 
TYPE A dummy variable: 1 for Equity REIT, 0 otherwise www.nareit.com 
 
In addition to these two variables, in the regression analysis we use a third proxy for firm 
focus that incorporates both types of diversification – property type and region. Specifically, we 
use the product of the two variables: Type * Region.  
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We also control for firm specific risk. DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) and Breeden and 
Viswanathan (1998) argue that hedging reduces noise to observing managerial abilities. They 
hypothesize that managers will hedge to reduce income volatility, thus conveying their abilities 
with less noise to shareholders. Following this argument, we expect that less transparent firms 
may benefit more from hedging. Firm transparency is measured by the portion of return variation 
explained by the market: R
2
.  The justification of this variable primarily comes from Barberis, 
Shleifer and Wurgler (2005), in which they present evidence that a stock’s R2 tends to increase 
following its inclusion to the S&P index. Furthermore, the increase is not easily explainable by 
fundamentals. This suggests that R
2
 might be higher for more transparent firms.   
The control variables include firm size, leverage ratio and REIT type.  Firm size is 
commonly used in the literature and is also included here.  If the costs of executing hedges are 
substantial, larger firms are more likely to employ hedging programs. On the other hand, if 
smaller firms face greater financial-distress costs and/or information asymmetry, the probability 
of smaller firms conducting hedges should be greater. As for the leverage ratio, we expect that 
the greater the leverage, the greater the probability of financial distress, thus the greater 
likelihood of hedging.  
To analyze the determinants of the level of derivatives use, we also employ a regression 
approach. The dependent variable is the notional amount of interest-rate derivatives over the 
market value of assets, where market value of assets is estimated by adding book value of debt to 
market value of equity. The sample for the level of hedging is restricted to firms that hedge. 
Since the sample is truncated, ordinary least-squares regression estimates are biased. We 
therefore use the maximum-likelihood method for the estimation of regression coefficients. The 
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amounts of options, swaps, futures and forwards positions are aggregated to determine the total 
amount of derivatives use.
6
  
 
4.  Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 2 shows that there are 71 hedgers out of 153 REITS in 2005 and 55 out of 127 
REITs in 2007. That is, the utilization rate is 46.41% in 2005 and 43.41% in 2007. In 2005 these 
hedgers include 60 equity REITs and 11 mortgage and hybrid REITs, while in 2007, 49 equity 
REITs and 6 mortgage and hybrid REITs are hedgers. In both years there is a smaller proportion 
of equity REITs engaged in hedging, compared to mortgage and hybrid REITs. This is sensible 
since equity arguably REITs are less sensitive to interest rate risk. In Horng and Wei (1999), they 
find 76 REITs out of 186 that reported derivatives use in 1995, while we find 71 out of 153 in 
2005 and 55 out of 127 in 2007, suggesting a slightly greater utilization of derivatives in recent 
years.
7
 
 
Table2: Summary of REITs' hedging activities 
   
 
Equity REITs   Mortgage/Hybrid REITs Total 
 
2005 2007 2005 2007 2005 2007 
Hedgers 60 49 11 6 71 55 
Non-hedgers 73 66 9 6 82 72 
Total 133 115 20 12 153 127 
 
                                                 
6
 Note, however, that this amount is only approximately equal to the hedge amount, since the hedge ratio between 
underlying assets and swaps, futures and forwards is one or very close to one, while the hedge ratios between 
underlying assets and options vary with terms of options, for which we do not have detailed information Another 
potential problem is that while the regulations for REITs restrict speculative activities, they also limit the level of 
hedging. 
7
 Horng and Wei (1998) find 41% usage of derivatives for REITs in 1995, and we find 47% in 2005 and 43% in 
2005. 
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Table 3 presents the choices of derivatives instruments by REITs. Interest-rate options 
are the most popular interest-rate derivatives that have been employed by REITs to hedge their 
interest-rate risk. However, swaps and combinations of swaps and options are also popular. Chen 
and Tzang (1988) find that REITs are sensitive to the changes of interest rates, especially to the 
long-term rates; since interest-rate swaps are often long-term contracts, their finding could 
explain why swaps are popular among REITs. Moreover, mortgage REITs might have greater 
needs to manage their duration gap between assets and liabilities, and swaps are efficient tools 
for managing gaps. The table suggests that mortgage REITs tend to use swaps or combinations 
of swaps and options more often than equity REITs.   
 
Table3: REITs' choices of derivative instruments 
   
 
Equity REITs      Mortgage/Hybrid REITs Total 
 
2005 2007 2005 2007 2005 2007 
Options only 26 24 5 2 31 26 
Swaps only 16 12 2 2 18 14 
Options/Swaps 18 13 4 2 22 15 
Total 60 49 11 6 71 55 
 
 
4.2 Independent Variables 
Before we conduct the regression analysis, insights may be gained from some descriptive 
statistics for the independent variables to be used in the subsequent regression analysis.   
 Table 4 gives a univariate comparison of hedgers and non-hedgers. Using both the t test 
and the sign-rank test, the results indicate that focused firms tend to be hedgers; the means of 
focus in property types are 0.75 and 0.60 for hedgers and non-hedgers, and the means of 
geographic focus are 0.64 and 0.48 for hedgers and non-hedgers, respectively. Thus the  
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Table 4: A comparison of independent variables between hedgers and non-hedgers 
The sample includes 153 REITs in 2005 and 127 REITs in 2007, and Table 1 describes the variables. The signs ***, ** and * denote significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Independent Variables All REITs Hedgers Non-Hedgers t-statistic Sign-Rank p-values 
                  Firm Focus: 
    Focus/Type 0.68 0.75 0.60 2.03* 0.08* 
      Focus/Region 0.59 0.64 0.48 2.43** 0.01*** 
     
 
                 Agency Costs: 
    
 
R
2
 0.07 0.06 0.08 -1.68 0.29 
                                                       
     M/B 1.75 1.81 1.38 2.35** 0.03** 
      SELF 0.54 0.71 0.35 7.44*** 0.01*** 
      INST 0.43 0.57 0.30 2.46** 0.01*** 
     
 
                  Control Variable: 
     Firm Size ($ Mil.) 3395.88 5530.17 1539.61 77.93*** 0.00*** 
                            Leverage: 
    
 
DEBT 0.44 0.47 0.42 2.02* 0.02** 
      COV 1.60 2.71 0.58 7.16*** 0.00*** 
      RATING 0.31 0.43 0.17 3.46*** 0.03** 
                            Substitutes/Liquidity: 
   
  
CASH 0.03 0.01 0.06 -2.78*** 0.00*** 
      SUBS 0.03 0.03 0.03 -2.03* 0.02** 
                            REIT Type:  
     TYPE 0.88 0.89 0.90 -2.06* 0.03** 
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univariate comparison is consistent with our expectation that hedgers tend to be more focused. 
However, there is no significance difference in terms of firm transparency as measured by R
2
.  
The table also indicates that hedgers tend to have higher market-to-book (M/B) ratio, tend 
to be self-administered, and tend to have greater institutional holdings, suggesting that agency 
problems play a role here.  More specifically, higher M/B might proxy for greater growth 
opportunities, and hedging could produce smoother cash flow stream to support these growth 
opportunities; stated differently, hedging could reduce the underinvestment problem. Self-
administered REITs are those not managed by outside advisors; as such, they might be lesser 
known to capital markets; hedging can smooth their cash flow streams and reduce their reliance 
on capital markets. However, the finding of hedgers having greater institutional holdings may be 
contrary to what agency problem might suggest. If greater institutional holdings imply lower 
agency problems, there should be less hedging motivated by agency problems. If, on the other 
hand, greater institutional holdings might reflect less control by managers; if the managers are 
self serving, they would have incentives to stabilize cash flows to secure their jobs. 
 There is also a greater tendency for larger firms to hedge, which is consistent with a 
substantial entry cost. Additionally, for hedgers, the debt ratio is on average higher but interest 
coverage is greater, the bond rating tends to be higher, and the cash holdings tend to be less—
note that these also tend to be the characteristics of larger firms.
8
 
Table 5 reports the correlation between independent variables. The table indicates that 
firm size (SZ) and market-to-book (M/B) are highly correlated with several other independent 
variables. To reduce the multicollinearity problem, in all following regression analyses, two  
                                                 
8
We also compare the statistics between 2005 and 2007. The statistics do not seem to vary substantially between 
2005 and 2007, with the exception of firm transparency and the market-to-book ratio. The R
2
, a measure of firm 
transparency, are 0.054 in 2005 and 0.072 in 2007. The market-to-book ratios are 1.94 and 1.32 for 2005 and 2007, 
respectively. The higher market-to-book ratio in 2005 is consistent with the general perception that the real estate 
market in 2005 is relatively better than that in 2007. 
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Table5: Correlation among independent variables  
The sample includes 153 REITs in 2005 and 127 REITs in 2007, and Table 1 describes the variables.  The signs ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Focus/Region 
Type* 
Region R
2
 M/B SELF INST 
SZ 
($ Mil.) DB COV RATING CASH SUBS 
REIT 
Type 
Focus/Type -0.05 -0.14* 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.14* -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 
Focus/Region 
 
-0.06 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.08* 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.02 
Type*Region 
 
 0.09* 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.16** -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03* 
R
2
 
 
 
 
-0.09* -0.01 -0.05 -0.12* -0.01 0.03 -0.08 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
M/B 
 
 
  
0.03 0.07* 0.18** -0.03 0.07 0.09* -0.09* -0.02 0.01 
SELF 
 
 
   
0.04 0.08* 0.05 0.04 0.02 -0.06 0.02 0.02 
INST 
 
 
    
0.09* 0.06 -0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.02 
SZ ($ Mil.) 
 
 
     
0.10* -0.05 0.03 -0.07* 0.08* -0.10** 
DB 
 
 
      
-0.04 -0.09* -0.02 0.01 -0.02 
COV 
 
 
       
-0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 
RATING 
 
 
        
-0.03 0.04 0.02 
CASH 
 
 
         
-0.04 -0.03 
SUBS 
 
 
          
0.01 
 
regression models are employed: one includes SZ and M/B and another excludes the two variables.   
 
4.3 Analysis of the Probability of Derivatives Use 
We employ the logistic regression method to assess the determinants for the probability of derivative use.  The dependent 
variable takes on the value of one for REITs that use derivatives, and zero otherwise. Table 6a gives the regression results with 
variables SZ and M/B, whereas Table 6b excludes SZ and M/B. The t statistics are shown in parentheses. The coefficients for 
intercepts are not shown. The sample data combines the years 2005 and 2007-- hereinafter, we refer this sample as the full sample.
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In addition, to assess the robustness of results, strictly cross-sectional regressions are 
performed separately on the years 2005 and 2007; hereinafter, they are referred to as subsamples. 
Consistent with our hypothesis, Table 6a shows a positive coefficient for all variables that 
measure the extent of firm focus, including property type focus (Focus/Type), geographic focus 
(Focus/Region) and the interaction term Type*Region. However, only Type*Region for the full 
sample is statistically significant at the 10% level. Therefore, the positive correlation between 
firm focus and hedging is fairly weak. As for the relation between firm transparency and hedging, 
the evidence also supports our conjecture. Specifically, the coefficient on R
2
, a measure of 
transparency, is significantly negative for all samples. This result is consistent with the theory of 
DeMarzo and Duffie (1995), in which they hypothesize that managers in less transparent firms 
have greater incentive to hedge, so that they can convey the abilities to investors with less noise. 
However, recall in Table 4 univariate comparisons between hedgers and non-hedgers, the 
difference in their R
2
 is not significant. Therefore, we conclude the overall evidence is weak for a 
negative relation between firm transparency and hedging.   
Consistent with most previous studies, Table 6a indicates a significantly positive 
relationship between the log of firm size and hedging for the full sample and subsamples. The 
greater inclination of larger firms to employ hedging can be explained by scale economics for 
information costs and/or transaction costs. The significantly negative relation for REITs TYPE 
(=1 for equity REITs) is consistent with the notion that mortgage REITs might have more 
incentives to hedge interest rate risk because their portfolios are inherently more sensitive to 
interest rate changes. Other coefficients that are significant but only for the full sample are: a 
negative coefficient for M/B, a positive coefficient for institutional holdings (INST) and a 
negative coefficient for cash holdings (CASH). 
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Table 6a: Logistic regression results with variables SZ and M/B 
The dependent variable is a dummy = 1 for REITs that hedge and 0 otherwise. The sample contains 153 REITs in 
2005 and 127 REITs in 2007, and Table 1 describes the variables. The t statistics are in the parentheses, and the 
signs ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Variable All(280) 2005(153) 2007(127) 
Firm Focus:  
  
Focus/Type 1.403 1.358 2.774 
 
(0.568) (0.724) (0.376) 
Focus/Region 1.558 0.658 1.949 
 
(0.289) (0.385) (0.938) 
Type*Region 1.341
*
 0.867 1.569 
 
(1.766) (0.957) (0.776) 
Agency Costs:  
  
R
2
 -0.000
***
 -0.000
**
 -0.000
***
 
 
(2.987) (2.036) (3.776) 
M/B -1.021
*
 -0.725 -1.864 
 
(1.838) (0.326) (0.433) 
SELF -0.108 -0.019 -0.002 
 
(-1.069) (0.401) (0.706) 
INST 0.039
*
 0.019 0.026
*
 
 
(1.977) (1.022) (1.899) 
Control Variable:  
  
Firm Size: Ln (SIZE) 0.785
***
 0.738
***
 0.759
***
 
 
(7.570) (5.387) (7.568) 
Leverage:  
  
DEBT 1.489 1.689 3.201 
 
(0.566) (0.768) (0.356) 
COV 0.0023 0.002 0.004 
 
(0.443) (0.585) (0.325) 
RATING -0.346 -0.407 -0.206 
 
(0.459) (0.559) (0.652) 
Substitutes/Liquidity:  
  
CASH -7.869
*
 -7.994 -6.098 
 
(2.111) (1.568) (1.567) 
SUBS -1.026 -1.442 -1.880 
 
(0.900) (0.768) (0.699) 
REIT Type:   
  
TYPE -2.538
***
 -3.559
***
 -2.775
**
 
 
(5.633) (7.787) (2.569) 
 
26 
 
The regression in Table 6b excludes two variables, SZ and M/B ratio. The results also 
point to a weak positive relationship between focus and hedging. Nevertheless, the evidence here 
is somewhat stronger—property type focus is significantly positive for the full sample as well as 
2007 subsample, and the interaction variable Type*Region is significantly positive for the full 
sample and 2005 subsample. Since the major difference between Tables 6a and 6b is the 
inclusion of firm size variable, the stronger evidence here for firm focus and hedging relation 
suggests that firm size effect is stronger than the effects associated with firm focus. The results 
for other variables are qualitatively similar to those in Table 6a. 
 
Table 6b: Logistic regression results without the variables SZ and M/B 
The dependent variable is a dummy = 1 for REITs that hedge and 0 otherwise. The sample contains 153 REITs in 
2005 and 127 REITs in 2007, and Table 1 describes the variables. The t statistics are in the parentheses, and the 
signs ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Variable All(280) 2005(153) 2007(127) 
Firm Focus: 
 
  
Focus/Type 0.835
*
 0.559 1.309
*
 
 
(1.786) (0.333) (1.987) 
Focus/Region 0.245 0.477 0.297 
 
(0.453) (0.345) (0.459) 
Type*Region 1.687
**
 1.898
*
 1.266 
 
(2.468) (2.045) (0.758) 
Agency Costs:  
  
R
2
 -0.000
***
 -0.000
***
 -0.000
***
 
 
(2.599) (2.503) (2.955) 
SELF -0.026 -0.067 -0.025 
 
(0.446) (0.103) (0.436) 
INST 0.064
*
 0.059 0.055
*
 
 
(2.042) (1.758) (1.995) 
Control Variable:  
  Leverage:  
  DEBT 0.268 0.316 0.269 
 
(0.446) (0.800) (0.335) 
COV 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 
(0.759) (0.810) (0.636) 
RATING 0.010 -0.000 0.006 
 
(0.136) (0.447) (0.212) 
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Substitutes/Liquidity:  
  
CASH -5.556 -3.866 -2.023
*
 
 
(0.518) (0.883) (1.869) 
SUBS -1.296 -1.454 -2.027 
 
(1.066) (0.854) (0.768) 
REIT Type:   
  TYPE -0.410
***
 -0.307
***
 -0.302
*
 
 
(7.788) (4.056) (1.866) 
 
 
Table 6c: Logistic regression results using one focus proxy 
The dependent variable is a dummy = 1 for REITs that hedge and 0 otherwise. The sample contains 280 REITs (153 
REITs in 2005 and 127 REITs in 2007), and Table 1 describes the variables. The focus proxy is Type (column I), 
Region (II) and Type*Region (III). The t statistics are in the parentheses, and the signs ***, ** and * denote 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Variable I II III 
Firm Focus: 
 
  
Focus/Type 0.759
**
 
  
 
(2.306) 
  
Focus/Region  0.553 
 
 
 (0.759) 
 
Type*Region  
 
1.308
**
 
 
 
 
(2.308) 
Agency Costs:  
  
R
2
 -0.000
*
 -0.000 -0.000
*
 
 
(1.906) (0.854) (1.846) 
SELF -0.107 -0.035 -0.046 
 
(0.965) (0.756) (0.593) 
INST 0.085 0.052 0.063
*
 
 
(1.302) (1.196) (2.042) 
Control Variable:  
  Leverage:  
  DEBT 0.388 0.199 0.268 
 
(0.899) (0.846) (0.446) 
COV -0.013 0.000 0.001 
 
(0.560) (0.308) (0.758) 
RATING -0.000 0.000 0.009 
 
(0.406) (0.637) (0.135) 
Substitutes/Liquidity:  
  
CASH -3.229
*
 -4.064 -2.596 
 
(1.795) (0.306) (0.306) 
SUBS -1.000 -0.845 -1.335 
 
(0.857) (1.252) (0.870) 
REIT Type:   
  TYPE -0.765
***
 -0.331
***
 -0.365
***
 
 
(6.330) (3.204) (11.034) 
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Summarizing the evidence to this point, we find weak evidence supportive of a positive 
relation between hedging and firm focus and a negative relation between hedging and firm 
transparency. Both are consistent with our expectations. The evidence also suggests a strong firm 
size effect: larger firms are more likely to be hedgers. We now turn our attention to the level or 
dollar amount of derivatives use.     
 
4.4 Analysis of the Level of Derivatives Use 
The results of ML estimates on the determinants of the level of hedging are shown in 
Table 7a and 7b; Table 7a includes SZ and M/B while Table 7b excludes them. The dependent 
variable is the total notional amount of derivatives over the market value of assets. The mean and 
the median value of this variable are 0.31 and 0.19, respectively. Stated simply, the results are 
similar to those in Tables 6a and 6b with one notable exception: the sign of firm size. Recall 
results in Table 6a, evidence indicate that larger REITs are more likely to use derivatives; here 
the results indicate that larger REITS hedge a less amount of derivatives relative to assets. Note 
that the firm size effect is consistent with the findings in Haushalter (1997) and Horng and Wei 
(1999). A possible interpretation is that larger firms have greater access to hedging expertise thus 
they tend to hedge; however larger firms tend to hedge to a smaller extent, perhaps due to their 
lower probability of financial distress. Table 7b that excludes SZ and M/B gives similar results.                                                       
 
Table 7a: The determinants of the level of hedging with the variables SZ and M/B 
The dependent variable is the dollar amount of hedging. The sample contains 71 REITs in 2005 and 55 REITs that 
use derivatives in 2007, and Table 1 describes the variables. The t statistics are in the parentheses, and the signs ***, 
** and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Variable All(126) 2005(71) 2007(55) 
                    Firm Focus:  
  
Focus/Type 
1.958 
2.499 1.678 
 
(0.459) (0.737) (0.685) 
Focus/Region 
1.386 
1.325 1.501 
 
(0.442) (0.853) (0.625) 
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Type*Region 0.835
*
 0.934 0.695
**
 
 
(1.896) 
(0.942) (2.451) 
Agency Costs:  
  
R
2
 
-0.001
*
 
-0.001 -0.001
**
 
 
(2.014) (1.203) (2.397) 
M/B 0.296 0.279
*
 0.345 
 
(1.042) (1.899) (0.785) 
SELF -0.050
*
 -0.035 -0.065
*
 
 
(1.757) (1.004) (2.044) 
INST 
0.001 
-0.000 0.001 
 
(0.783) 
(0.623) (0.200) 
Control Variable: 
 
  Firm Size: Ln (SIZE) -0.075
**
 -0.086
***
 -0.001 
 
(2.455) (5.117) (0.899) 
Leverage:  
  DEBT 0.539 0.706
*
 0.428 
 
(0.474) 
(1.996) (0.788) 
COV 
0.000 
0.000 0.000 
 
(0.452) 
(0.396) (0.752) 
RATING -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 
 
(0.747) 
(1.028) (0.853) 
Substitutes/Liquidity: 
 
  CASH -1.757 -1.305 -2.024 
 
(1.032) (0.376) (0.684) 
SUBS 
-0.409 
-1.066 -0.320 
 
(-0.396) (0.776) (0.536) 
REIT Type:  
 
  
TYPE 
-0.567
*
 
-0.409
*
 -0.762 
 
(2.082) (1.965) (0.705) 
 
 
Table 7b: The determinants of the level of hedging without the variables SZ and M/B 
The dependent variable is the dollar amount of hedging. The sample contains 71 REITs in 2005 and 55 REITs that 
use derivatives in 2007, and Table 1 describes the variables.  The t statistics are in the parentheses, and the signs ***, 
** and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Variable All(126) 2005(71) 2007(55) 
Firm Focus:  
  Focus/Type 1.394 1.306 1.496 
 
(0.316) (0.788) (0.689) 
Focus/Region 1.006  0.903 1.136 
 
(0.798)  (0.824) (0.395) 
Type*Region 0.902
*
 1.144
*
        0.840 
 
(2.000) (1.845)       (0.512) 
Agency Costs: 
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R
2
 -0.000
*
 -0.000
*
 -0.000
*
 
 
(2.122) (2.140) (2.100) 
SELF -0.015
*
 -0.013
**
 -0.017
*
 
 
(2.019) (2.458) (2.226) 
INST 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 
(0.850) (0.448) (0.265) 
Control Variable:  
  Leverage:  
  DEBT 0.521
*
 0.539
**
 0.577
*
 
 
(1.867) (2.354) (2.036) 
COV 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.109) (0.298) (0.332) 
RATING -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.779) (0.645) (0.552) 
Substitutes/Liquidity:  
  CASH -0.755 -0.739
*
 -0.783 
 
(1.146) (2.042) (0.896) 
SUBS -0.376 -0.590 -0.201 
 
(0.455) (0.519) (0.398) 
REIT Type:   
  TYPE -0.674
*
 -0.682
*
 -0.618
*
 
 
(2.002) (1.962) (2.231) 
 
 
Table 7c: The determinants of the level of hedging using one focus proxy 
The dependent variable is the dollar amount of hedging. The sample contains 126 REITs (71 REITs in 2005 and 55 
REITs in 2007), and Table 1 describes the variables. The focus proxy is Type (column I), Region (II) and 
Type*Region (III). The t statistics are in the parentheses, and the signs ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
Variable I II III 
Firm Focus:  
  Focus/Type 2.306 
 
(0.758)   
Focus/Region  1.205  
 
 (0.898)  
Type*Region   0.746
*
 
 
  (1.886) 
Agency Costs: 
   
R
2
 -0.000
*
 -0.000 -0.000
*
 
 
(2.203) (1.506) (2.231) 
SELF -0.006 -0.009 -0.030
*
 
 
(1.068) (1.753) (2.135) 
INST 0.000 0.000 0.000
*
 
 
(1.502) (0.762) (0.850) 
Control Variable:    
Leverage:    
DEBT 0.946 0.332
*
 0.490
*
 
 
(1.032) (1.996) (2.564) 
COV -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.967) (0.562) (0.109) 
RATING -0.000 -0.000
*
 -0.000 
 
(1.552) (1.884) (0.906) 
Substitutes/Liquidity:    
CASH -0.493 -0.695 -0.755 
 
(0.394) (1.339) (1.146) 
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SUBS -0.534 -0.409 -0.376 
 
(1.307) (0.972) (0.455) 
REIT Type:     
TYPE -0.703
*
 -0.697
**
 -0.677
*
 
 (2.130) (2.309) (2.016) 
 
 
 
4.5 Swap Users versus Non-hedgers 
 As mentioned earlier, previous studies suggest additional motives for interest-rate swaps. 
For example swaps can be used to control the asset substitution problem. Also, Titman (1992) 
theorizes that firms expecting improvements in operations have an incentive to borrow a floating 
rate loan and swap it into a fixed rate loan. The intuition is that when the operation does improve, 
the risk premium on the floating rate loan can be adjusted lower while the swap allows the firm 
to keep most of the interest payments fixed, reducing interest rate risk.  
The sample here removes REIT hedgers that do not use swaps; stated differently, it 
excludes hedgers that utilize options only. The numbers of REITs that use only options are 31 in 
2005 and 26 in 2007s; accordingly the sample sizes are 122 in 2005 and 101 in 2007, 
respectively.        
The regression results are displayed in Table 8a (with the variables SZ and M/B) and 
Table 8b (without SZ and M/B). The dependent variable takes on the value of one for swap 
hedgers and zero for non-hedgers. In Table 8a, firm focus (represented by the product of 
Focus/Type and Focus/Region) and firm size (represented by the log of firm size) are both 
positively associated with the possibilities of using swap, while the coefficients of REIT TYPE 
are negative for all samples. The findings are similar to the earlier results. That is, REITs that are 
more concentrated in their main businesses are more likely to employee interest-rate swaps, 
especially for mortgage REITs. Further, the higher the level of transparency, the lower the usage 
of swap. 
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Table 8a: Logistic regression: comparisons between swap users and non-hedgers 
The dependent variable is a dummy = 1 for REITs that use swaps and 0 for non-hedgers. The sample contains 122 
REITs in 2005 and 101 REITs in 2007, and Table 1 describes the variables. The t statistics are in the parentheses, 
and the signs ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Variable All(223) 2005(122) 2007(101) 
Firm Focus:  
  Focus/Type 1.626 1.784 1.903 
 
(0.456) (0.826) (0.778) 
Focus/Region 1.639 1.806 1.566 
 
(0.551) (0.697) (0.856) 
Type*Region 1.640
*
 1.692
*
 1.629* 
 
(1.879) (1.993) (2.100) 
Agency Costs:  
  R
2
 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
*
 
 
(1.768) (1.235) (1.958) 
M/B -2.930 -2.846 -3.201 
 
(0.747) (0.593) (1.067) 
SELF -0.040 -0.033 -0.008 
 
(1.233) (0.865) (0.559) 
INST 0.006 0.005 0.096 
 
(0.632) (1.342) (1.455) 
Control Variable:  
  Firm Size: Ln (SIZE) 3.467
**
 3.303
 *
 3.796
**
 
 
(2.259) (2.154) (2.356) 
Leverage:  
  DEBT 1.343 1.694 1.526 
 
(0.752) (0.824) (1.427) 
COV -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
 
(0.858) (1.407) (0.122) 
RATING -1.030 -1.040 -1.039
*
 
 
(1.667) (1.424) (2.226) 
Substitutes/Liquidity:  
  CASH -16.203 -16.927 -11.338 
 
(0.425) (0.876) (1.339) 
SUBS -3.749 -3.213 -4.084 
 
(1.515) (1.203) (1.049) 
REIT Type:  
  TYPE -1.879
***
 -1.893
***
 -1.609
***
 
 
(5.388) (5.246) (3.626) 
 
 
Table 8b: Logistic regression: comparisons between swap users and non-hedgers the variables SZ and M/B 
 The dependent variable is a dummy = 1 for REITs that use swaps and 0 for non-hedgers. The sample contains 122 
REITs in 2005 and 101 REITs in 2007, and Table 1 describes the variables. The t statistics are in the parentheses, 
and the signs ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Variable All(223) 2005(122) 2007(101) 
Firm Focus:  
  Focus/Type 1.232
*
 1.276
*
 1.864
*
 
 
(1.998) (1.979) (1.853) 
Focus/Region 1.503 1.513 1.428 
 
(1.396) (1.027) (1.285) 
Type*Region 1.807
*
 1.695
*
 2.403
**
 
 
(2.024) (1.951) (2.449) 
Agency Costs:  
  R
2
 -0.000
*
 -0.000
*
 -0.000 
 
(1.853) (2.092) (1.424) 
SELF -0.018 -0.019 -0.012 
 
(0.762) (0.618) (0.856) 
INST 0.000 0.000 0.006 
 
(1.588) (1.305) (0.510) 
Control Variable:  
  Leverage:  
  DEBT 1.069 0.956 1.732 
 
(0.645) (0.967) (1.256) 
COV -0.003 -0.005 0.001 
 
(1.200) (1.453) (0.762) 
RATING -0.874 -0.764 -1.000
*
 
 
(1.389) (1.477) (2.178) 
Substitutes/Liquidity:  
  CASH -7.004 -7.037 -6.892 
 
(0.325) (0.190) (0.791) 
SUBS -2.053 -1.902 -2.225 
 
(0.967) (1.406) (0.847) 
REIT Type:  
  TYPE -1.044
*
 -0.963
*
 -1.101
*
 
 
(2.149) (1.834) (2.200) 
 
 
Table 8c: Logistic regression using one focus proxy: comparisons between swap users and non-hedgers  
The dependent variable is a dummy = 1 for REITs that use swaps and 0 for non-hedgers. The sample contains 223 
REITs (122 REITs in 2005 and 101 REITs in 2007), and Table 1 describes the variables. The focus proxy is Type 
(column I), Region (II) and Type*Region (III). The t statistics are in the parentheses, and the signs ***, ** and * 
denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Variable I II III 
Firm Focus:  
  Focus/Type 2.065
**
 
  
 
(2.277) 
  Focus/Region  1.904 
 
 
 (1.029) 
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Type*Region  
 
1.997
*
 
 
 
 
(2.106) 
Agency Costs:  
  R
2
 -0.000
*
 -0.000 -0.000
*
 
 
(1.796) (1.177) (2.034) 
SELF -0.029
*
 -0.018 -0.018 
 
(1.826) (0.762) (0.762) 
INST 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 
(1.034) (0.825) (1.350) 
Control Variable:  
  Leverage:  
  DEBT 1.205 1.452 1.119 
 
(0.416) (0.804) (0.402) 
COV -0.000 -0.001 -0.003 
 
(0.389) (1.037) (0.387) 
RATING -0.796 -0.798 -0.803
*
 
 
(1.253) (1.469) (1.879) 
Substitutes/Liquidity:  
  CASH -6.587 -7.296 -7.063 
 
(0.268) (0.773) (0.501) 
SUBS -1.677 -1.896 -1.889 
 
(0.705) (0.534) (0.563) 
REIT Type:   
  TYPE -1.259
**
 -1.926
*
 -1.325
*
 
 
(2.361) (2.068) (2.198) 
 
Regressions concerning the amount or level of swap usage are given in Table 9a (with SZ 
and M/B) and Table 9b (without SZ and M/B). The numbers of swap hedgers are 40 in 2005 and 
29 in 2007. The dependent variable is the amount of interest-rate swaps over the market value of 
assets, and the mean and median are 0.15 and 0.10; which suggests that swaps only account for 
less than half of the total level of hedging on average. The conclusions are generally the same, 
with one exception: the signs of the firm size. Here the sign of firm size is positive whereas the 
corresponding coefficient in Table 7b is negative. That is, not only larger firms have a greater 
tendency to use swaps, they also tend to engage in greater amount of swap contracts. The latter 
can be explained by the following: interest rate swap is a convenient tool in managing interest 
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rate risk. Larger firms typically have more complex financial structure than small firms; if so, it 
would be sensible for them to actively use interest rate swaps.              
 
Table 9a The determinants of the level of swap usage 
The dependent variable is the dollar amount of swaps. The sample contains 71 REITs in 2005 and 55 REITs that use 
derivatives in 2007, and Table 1 describes the variables. The t statistics are in the parentheses, and the signs ***, ** 
and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Variable All(69) 2005(40) 2007(29) 
Firm Focus:  
  Focus/Type 1.203 0.942 1.329 
 
(0.421) (1.253) (0.746) 
Focus/Region 1.883 2.002 1.819 
 
(1.338) (1.467) (1.002) 
Type*Region 0.573
*
 0.523
*
 0.584
*
 
 
(2.259) (1.830) (2.056) 
Agency Costs:  
  R
2
 -0.000
*
 0.000 -0.000
*
 
 
(2.022) (1.366) (2.233) 
M/B -0.074 -0.083 0.024 
 
(0.125) (0.435) (0.751) 
SELF -0.009 -0.012 -0.004 
 
(1.244) (1.302) (0.886) 
INST 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 
(1.020) (0.774) (0.738) 
Control Variable:  
  Firm Size: Ln(SIZE) 0.018
*
 0.015
*
 0.028
**
 
 
(2.263) (1.775) (2.538) 
Leverage:  
  DEBT 0.002 0.001 -0.040 
 
(0.788) (0.935) (1.023) 
COV -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 
(0.266) (0.473) (0.100) 
RATING -0.050 -0.051 -0.037 
 
(0.544) (0.638) (0.728) 
Substitutes/Liquidity:  
  CASH 0.122 0.093 0.189 
 
(1.477) (1.023) (0.566) 
SUBS -0.334 -0.396 -0.306 
 
(1.259) (0.766) (1.344) 
REIT Type:   
  TYPE 0.020 0.014 -0.028
*
 
 
(0.788) (0.553) (1.909) 
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Table 9b The determinants of the level of swap usage without the variables SZ and M/B  
The dependent variable is the dollar amount of swaps. The sample contains 71 REITs in 2005 and 55 REITs that use 
derivatives in 2007, and Table 1 describes the variables. The t statistics are in the parentheses, and the signs ***, ** 
and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Variable All(69) 2005(40) 2007(29) 
Firm Focus:  
  
Focus/Type 0.297 0.380 0.435 
 
(0.122) (0.497) (0.233) 
Focus/Region 0.813 0.790 0.874 
 
(1.525) (1.243) (0.786) 
Type*Region 1.894
*
 1.950
*
 1.427
*
 
 
(2.153) (1.803) (1.995) 
Agency Costs:  
  
R
2
 -0.000
*
 -0.000
*
 -0.000
*
 
 
(2.169) (2.088) (2.269) 
SELF -0.057
*
 -0.066
**
 -0.003 
 
(2.134) (2.403) (1.468) 
INST -0.000 -0.001 0.001 
 
(0.588) (1.204) (1.023) 
Control Variable:  
  
Leverage:  
  
DEBT -0.040 -0.051 -0.031 
 
(1.233) (1.175) (0.967) 
COV -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 
(0.352) (0.786) (0.642) 
RATING -0.009 -0.010 -0.007 
 
(1.204) (1.548) (1.535) 
Substitutes/Liquidity:  
  
CASH 0.127 0.114 0.151
*
 
 
(1.033) (1.468) (1.337) 
SUBS -0.109 -0.114 -0.096 
 
(1.425) (1.732) (1.203) 
REIT Type:   
  
TYPE 0.020
*
 0.020
*
 -0.019
*
 
 
(2.255) (2.176) (2.004) 
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Table 9c The determinants of the level of swap usage using one focus proxy  
The dependent variable is the dollar amount of swaps. The sample contains 69 REITs (71 REITs in 2005 and 55 
REITs in 2007) that use derivatives, and Table 1 describes the variables. The focus proxy is Type (column I), 
Region (II) and Type*Region (III). The t statistics are in the parentheses, and the signs ***, ** and * denote 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Variable I II III 
Firm Focus:  
  
Focus/Type 0.409
*
 
  
 
(1.840) 
  
Focus/Region  0.976 
 
 
 (1.212) 
 
Type*Region  
 
     1.980
*
 
 
 
 
(2.203) 
Agency Costs:  
  
R
2
 -0.000
*
 -0.000
*
 -0.000
*
 
 
(1.935) (2.117) (2.202) 
SELF -0.259 -0.009 -0.042
*
 
 
(1.505) (1.036) (2.093) 
INST -0.000
*
 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(1.905) (1.439) (0.374) 
Control Variable:  
  
Leverage:  
  
DEBT -0.016 -0.059 -0.022 
 
(0.585) (1.510) (1.396) 
COV -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.993) (0.744) (0.372) 
RATING -0.002 -0.010 -0.008 
 
(1.069) (1.535) (1.652) 
Substitutes/Liquidity:  
  
CASH 0.096 0.103 0.104 
 
(1.206) (1.498) (1.442) 
SUBS -0.068 -0.090 -0.090 
 
(0.892) (1.502) (0.934) 
REIT Type:   
  
TYPE 0.079
**
 0.013
*
 0.021
*
 
 
(2.352) (2.147) (2.224) 
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4.6 A robustness check using lagged values of independent variables 
Firm focus or transparency might be endogenous or simultaneously determined along 
with firms’ hedging operations. To address this concern, in this section we explore the 
relationship between the probability of derivatives use and firm focus in prior year, as a 
robustness check. Specifically, the dependent variable here is hedging activity in 2007, whereas 
all independent variables are observations from 2005. The results are given in Table 10a and 10b. 
Again, we present two regression models: one includes REITs’ sizes and M/B ratios as the 
explanatory variables and another without them. Consistent with results of contemporaneous 
regressions, firm size has a significant positive effect on hedging choice. This indicates that 
larger firms are more inclined to employ hedging programs. More important to our study, we 
find a positive relationship between firm focus and hedging, consistent with the notion that 
REITs with more focus on their main businesses are more likely to hedge. However, as in earlier 
analyses, the evidence for the relation is not overwhelming and the relation is only significant 
when the firm size variable is excluded. One major finding that is different from our prior results 
is that the relation between R
2
 and the probability of hedging is statistically insignificant 
although it remains to be negative. Thus the overall evidence for a negative association between 
hedging and firm transparency is not strong. 
 
Table 10a: Logistic regression results – A robustness check  
The dependent variable is a dummy = 1 for REITs that hedge and 0 for non-hedgers. The sample contains 153 
REITs in 2005 and 127 REITs in 2007, and Table 1 describes the variables. This regression uses the values of 
REITs focus and transparency in 2005 on hedging behaviors in 2007. The sample size is 127 REITs that exist for 
both years. There are two regressions: one with SZ and M/B as control variables and the other without SZ and M/B. 
The t statistics are in the parentheses, and the signs ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
Variables  w/ SZ & M/B w/o SZ & M/B 
Firm Focus:   
Focus/Type 1.028 0.238 
 
(0.246) (0.647) 
Focus/Region 1.034 0.196 
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(0.322) (0.435) 
Type*Region 1.129 1.104
**
 
 
(1.132) (2.545) 
Agency Costs:  
 R
2
 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.675) (0.963) 
M/B -1.325
*
 - 
 
(2.156) - 
SELF -0.076 -0.045 
 
(0.987) (0.756) 
INST 0.049
*
 0.063
*
 
 
(2.254) (2.057) 
Control Variable:  
 Firm Size: Ln(SIZE) 1.163
***
 - 
 
(5.336) - 
Leverage:  
 DEBT 1.036 0.640 
 
(0.846) (1.755) 
COV 0.004 0.002 
 
(0.238) (0.623) 
RATING -0.097 -0.008 
 
(0.536) (0.387) 
Substitutes/Liquidity:  
 CASH -5.259
*
 -4.034
*
 
 
(2.114) (1.924) 
SUBS -0.642 -0.998 
 
(0.900) (0.524) 
REIT Type:   
 TYPE -2.167
***
 -0.409
***
 
 
(3.895) (4.953) 
 
 
Table 10b: Logistic regression results using one focus proxy  
The dependent variable is a dummy = 1 for REITs that hedge and 0 for non-hedgers. The sample contains 280 
REITs (153 REITs in 2005 and 127 REITs in 2007), and Table 1 describes the variables (SZ and M/b are excluded). 
This regression uses the values of REITs focus and transparency in 2005 on hedging behaviors in 2007. The sample 
size is 127 REITs that exist for both years. The focus proxy is Type (column I), Region (II) and Type*Region (III). 
The t statistics are in the parentheses, and the signs ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
Variables I II III 
Firm Focus:    
Focus/Type 1.265   
 
(0.925)   
Focus/Region         1.721  
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 (0.322)  
Type*Region   
 
     1.339
*
 
 
  (1.906) 
Agency Costs:    
R
2
 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.795) (1.265) (1.629) 
SELF -0.049 -0.057 -0.072 
 
(0.306) (0.423) (1.395) 
INST 0.026
*
 0.010
*
 0.052 
 
(2.039) (2.293) (1.729) 
Control Variable:    
Leverage:    
DEBT 0.906 1.116 1.067 
 
(0.792) (1.395) (1.035) 
COV 0.002 0.004 0.004 
 
(0.704) (0.603) (0.965) 
RATING -0.070 -0.089 -0.103 
 
(0.952) (0.755) (0.239) 
Substitutes/Liquidity:    
CASH -3.265 -5.323
*
 -5.703
*
 
 
(1.603) (2.203) (2.825) 
SUBS -0.706 -0.645 -0.662 
 
(1.356) (1.369) (0.638) 
REIT Type:     
TYPE -2.036
***
 -2.120
***
 -2.115
***
 
 
(2.956) (3.201) (3.261) 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this study, we examine the use of derivatives in the REIT industry. We find 46.41% 
utilization rate in 2005 and 43.41% in 2007. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that, 
relative to diversified firms, focused firms are more likely to engage in hedging. Focused firms 
also tend to be involved in greater amount of hedging. However, the evidence is not strong 
because not all measures of firm focus are statistically significant.  
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Additional results are as follows. Consistent with our expectation and with DeMarzo and 
Duffie (1995), we document a negative relation between hedging and transparency. However, 
the evidence is also weak, since the univariate comparison between hedgers and non-hedgers 
does not indicate a significant difference in firm. Our results support a firm size effect that is 
consistent with previous literature. Namely, larger REITs are more likely to hedge, but their 
hedge amounts tend to be smaller (relative to their assets) than their smaller counterparts. A 
possible explanation is as follows: larger firms tend to hedge due to economies of scale in entry 
costs or execution costs, but they hedge smaller amounts because they are less likely to be in 
financial distress. 
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Chapter 3 
Bank Performance and Board Structure: 
The Case of US and Chinese Banks 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper, we examine the relation between bank performance and board structure by 
using a sample of 74 US banks and 53 Chinese banks for the period 2002 to 2006. We expect 
that the effectiveness of board to be less in China, due to the stronger role of government. Indeed, 
the empirical relation between board structure and performance is virtually non-existing in China. 
In particular, for the US sample, the board size is found to be significantly and negatively 
correlated with ROA, but a larger board also tends to be associated with lower costs. For Chinese 
banks, the evidence indicates that governance variables are not significantly correlated with 
performances with the exception of block ownership: there is strong evidence that the relation 
between block ownership and bank performance is negative. In China, block ownership 
primarily comes from government shares. Therefore, the overall evidence is consistent with our 
conjecture that the role of board governance structure is of secondary importance in Chinese 
banks, perhaps due to the strong role of government. Additionally, we find substantial 
differences in board structure between the two countries; in particular the average board size and 
the proportion of outside directors for US banks are almost twice of those in China.  
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1. Introduction 
Much of the literature on board structure documents that the effectiveness of board 
affects performances, but the majority of which examine non-financial firms
9
. In this study, we 
examine the relation between board structure and performance in the Chinese and US banking 
industry.  
One of our major objectives is to examine the role of government ownership. The 
Chinese banking industry is characterized by substantial government ownership. It is likely that 
substantial government ownership will reduce the effectiveness of bank board monitoring. 
Therefore, we expect the relation between board structure and performance to be weaker in 
China relative to that in the US.  
Extant research on banks governance focuses on the relation between performance and 
ownership structure. In contrast, we concentrate on the interaction between performance and 
board structure, rather than ownership structure. It is conceivable, and recent turmoil suggests, 
that with the increased pace of securitization (especially since mid 80s), even large owners may 
not be able to adequately assess a bank’s risk, but board members might with generally closer 
association with managers. To the extent this argument is correct, it is at least equally important 
to examine the relation between board structure and performance.  
Because banks are heavily regulated, it is also conceivable that banking firm governance 
differs from that of unregulated firms. On the one hand, regulation might serve as an alternative 
form of monitoring, thus reducing the role of the board structure. On the other hand, if deposit 
insurance premium is not priced correctly or if securitization leads to improper risk transfer, 
                                                 
9
See in particular Boone et al. (2007) and Coles et al. (2008). 
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some bank managers might pursue riskier customers and activities
10
; as such, the board’s role 
might be critical. 
The existing literature remains mainly concerning the U.S. and Europe (Berger et al., 
2005; Iannotta et al., 2007), where the governance systems are quite different from those found 
in China and other transition economies (Cull et al., 2005). Therefore, we perform an empirical 
comparison of US and Chinese banks. The interesting points about Chinese banks are their rapid 
growth, their large size, and heavy government ownership.  La Porta et al. (2002) find that 
government ownership of banks is rather prevalent around the world, so examining a 
representative country in that regard is potentially useful. If regulation serves as an alternative 
form of monitoring, corporate governance for Chinese banks is likely to be less important than 
that of the US banks.  However, there are some potential offsetting factors: most of them are 
newly-listed and growing rapidly; the merger market in Chinese markets is virtually non-existing; 
further, they represent the dominant source of corporate financing because both the stock market 
and bond market are relatively small and very volatile.  It is not impossible that public scrutiny 
on bank corporate governance might be more intense in a fast-growing industry, in an industry 
where outside threat is lacking, in an industry that is critical for economy growth, and in an 
industry where reform has recently been introduced, and competition among managers has 
intensified. Thus, whether the influence of board structure is stronger or weaker in the China is 
largely an empirical issue. To our knowledge, there is no research about bank board structure in 
China
11
.   
                                                 
10
 In a theoretical model, Allen and Carletti (2006) argue that when banks with idiosyncratic liquidity risk transfer 
credit risk via securitization, welfare declines. They further suggest that when these banks hedge the risk through 
derivatives markets, it can increase the risk of crisis—a prediction that seems accurate. 
11
 China has increasingly emphasized the importance of corporate governance, and the corporate governance in the 
Chinese economy has recently received a lot of attention in the literature (Sun and Tobin, 2005). 
48 
 
In sum, bank governance is unique and changes in banking environment during the 1990s 
and early 2000s substantially altered the governance of the world’s banking organizations. What 
is the effect of board structure on bank performance? In order to address this issue, this paper 
aims to empirically analyze the relation between bank performance and board structure, in one of 
the developed economics -- the US bank industry, and one in developing economies -- Chinese 
banks. Our findings find a significant relation between the board size and bank performance in 
the US sample, but the evidence is mixed and varies with performance measures. For China, 
evidence implies that block ownership is an important determinant of Chinese bank performance. 
There is no other significant relationship between board governance and bank performance for 
either country. Therefore, the overall evidence suggests that board structure is only weakly 
linked to performances.  
The structure of our paper is as follows. The next section presents a review of literature. 
Section 3 discusses the expected relation between board structure and performance. The data and 
methodology are given in section 4. In section 5, we examine the link between board structure 
and banking performance. We conclude in section 6.  
 
2. Literature Review  
In this section, we review research on the performance effects of corporate governance. 
We first concentrate on the broader set of studies on non-financial firms, then on financial firms. 
This is followed by a discussion of the Chinese banking system. 
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2.1 The Performance Effect of Board Structure in Non-Financial Firms  
From the agency theory perspective, the objective of corporate governance is to ensure 
that managers resort to value maximizing strategies (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Most empirical 
studies in corporate governance focus on the linkage between corporate governance and firm 
performance. There are many related studies; because our main interest is in the banking industry, 
we only discuss a few representative papers. 
Linck, Netter and Yang (2008) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) analyze the 
determinants of board structure. They indicate that the three important measures of board 
structure are board size, board independence, and board leadership. Boone et al. (2007) imply 
board structure reflects a firm’s competitive environment and managerial team. Coles et al. 
(2007)
12
 shows that the market-to-book ratio increases with the board size for complex firm and 
with the percentage of insiders on the board for firms in which firm-specific knowledge is 
important. Weisbach (1988), Byrd and Hickman (1992) and Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) find 
positive relation between abnormal returns and outside board membership. Regarding 
CEO/Chair duality, Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell (1997) document that the duality concentrates 
management’s power and might exacerbate potential conflicts of interest, and results in a less 
effective monitoring of the CEO. 
The concern for corporate governance is evident from studies on markets around the 
world. For example, several studies show that the negative board size effects exist for publicly 
traded firms in other countries, for example: Conyon and Peck (1998) in a sample of publicly 
                                                 
12
 This paper reexamines the relation between firm value and board structure. They find that complex firms, which 
have greater advising requirements than simple firms, have larger boards with more outside directors. The relation 
between Tobin''s Q and board size is U-shaped, which suggests that either very small or very large boards are 
optimal. Moreover, they find some evidence that R&D-intensive firms, for which the firm-specific knowledge of 
insiders is relatively important, have a higher fraction of insiders on the board and that, for these firms, Q increases 
with the fraction of insiders on the board.  
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traded firms in the UK, France, the Netherlands, Denmark and Italy; and de Andres, Azofra and 
Lopez (2005) in a sample of firms from ten OECD countries. However, Jong et al. (2000) report 
insignificant board size effects in Dutch firms. These studies nevertheless investigate primarily 
developed countries, and our understanding of corporate governance in emerging markets is 
lacking. 
Regarding the relationship between board structure and firm performance in China, a few 
studies investigate non-financial firms and find some evidence that implies board structure might 
affect the firm performance (Wen et al., 2002).  
 Li and Naughton (2007) focus on the corporate governance reform in China and they 
suggest that board size is positively related to short-term returns, while in the long-run, a positive 
relationship exists between performance and the voluntary post-listing separation of the roles of 
CEO and Chair of the Board.  
Chen and Lin (2007) examine the relationship between corporate governance and 
corporate fraud, and their results reveal a lower proportion of independent members in board of 
directors for firms experiencing corporate fraud than for no-fraud firms; and they also imply that 
the firms with duality of CEO and COB are more likely to commit corporate fraud than the other 
firms. Moreover, Long (2008) indicates that, earnings management is positively influenced by 
the CEO duality and negatively affected by concentration ownership, board size and proportion 
of independent directors.  
In sum, Su, Xu and Phan (2008) argue that ownership concentration of Chinese listed 
firms have a U-shaped relationship with board compensation, board size and the presence of 
independent directors, which provides corroborating evidence that principal–principal conflict 
can lead to high agency costs. 
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2.2 The Performance Effect of Board Structure in the Banking Industry 
Banks’ regulatory structure is unique; it focuses on reducing losses associated with bank 
failure as well as fair lending. In return for access to federal deposit insurance, banks face 
regulation related to such areas as safety and soundness, fair lending practices, and consumer 
protection. Flannery (1994) notes that because of the structure in the banking industry and the 
high degree of leverage with which banks operate, the impact of managerial actions on 
shareholder wealth is magnified. It is frequently argued that deposit insurance that is not priced 
to fully reflect the risk of the institution provides owners and managers with additional incentives 
to enhance risk-taking behavior. This suggests a greater need for the monitoring of management 
to insure that decisions are consistent with shareholder wealth maximization. Additionally, the 
lack of hostile takeovers in this market suggests that external discipline for managers is weak 
(Booth, Cornett, and Tehranian, 2002). Taking these factors into considerations, it can be argued 
that benefit of aligning the incentives of managers and shareholders may be as important in 
banking firms as in less regulated industrial firms. 
On the other hand, during the 1990s the U.S. commercial bank regulation focuses on the 
prompt corrective action. Thus, managerial decisions, and their impact on the safety and 
soundness of the bank, are monitored closely by regulators. To the extent that monitoring by 
regulators limits the amount of managerial discretion (and thus its effects on shareholder wealth), 
board monitoring becomes less important.  
Macey and O’Hara (2003) argue that a broader view of corporate governance should be 
adopted in the case of banking institutions, and corporate governance mechanisms for banks 
should take care of the interests of depositors as well as shareholders. Depositors do not know 
the true value of a bank’s loan portfolio, as such information is incommunicable and very costly 
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to reveal. This information asymmetry gives bank managers an incentive to invest in riskier 
assets than they promised
13
. Thus the specialty of the banking firm requires public protection of 
depositors from opportunistic bank management. However, this specialty also affects the 
relationship between shareholders and managers and the existence of deposit insurance may 
reduce the need for banks to raise capital from large, uninsured investors who have the incentive 
to exert corporate control. 
The competition in the product or service market may act as a substitute for corporate 
governance mechanisms. However, the banking industry, due to its information-intensive nature 
and deposit insurance, may be less competitive than other business sectors. Therefore, this lack 
of competitive pressure suggests that banks may need stronger corporate governance 
mechanisms than other firms.  
Previous empirical studies analyze the relation between corporate governance and bank 
performance. Most of them study the relation between the ownership and bank performance
14
. 
However, few look at the role of board structure. To our knowledge, Adams and Mehran (2008) 
is the only one that examines the relation between board structure and performance for banks. 
They find a non-negative relationship between board size and performance
15
 and suggest that the 
advantages of larger boards may outweigh their costs.  This study is similar to ours. However, 
there are several differences. First, their examination period ends before 2000, while ours is post-
2002 when Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) is enacted. The SOX imposes stronger director liability. 
Moreover, this period is characterized by a huge expansion of the securitization. The importance 
                                                 
13
 For example, managers might choose to invest in reputation capital (Bhattacharya et al., 1998). 
14
 Saunders et al. (1990) study the relationship between bank ownership structure and risk taking during the period 
of deregulation, and Iannotta et al. (2007) suggest that the degree of ownership concentration is positively related 
with the bank’s loan quality and asset control but do not significantly affects its profitability. 
15
 This is opposite with the negative relationship between board size and performance documented in non-banks 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998).   
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of board is likely to be different from that before SOX. Second, we also examine the Chinese 
bank board structure, another important banking sector.  In addition, we examine three important 
dimensions of board structure: board size, board independence, and board leadership, while they 
focus on the effects of board size. 
 
2.3 What’s Special about Corporate Governance in Chinese Banks?  
2.3.1 Background of Chinese Banking 
In China, there are four major types of banks: policy banks (3), big nationwide 
commercial banks with substantial state ownership (Big Four), regional commercial banks (13), 
and city commercial banks (117). A considerable number of city commercial banks are not 
publicly traded. There are also numerous, non-publicly-traded credit unions and mutual banks. In 
this study, we focus on big nationwide banks, regional banks, and city commercial banks for 
which data is available. In terms of the total asset size, the Chinese banking sector is quite large, 
only smaller than the US and Japan. In terms of the number of banks and credit unions, the 
Chinese sector is probably the largest in the world. 
It should be noted that the banking sector in China is dominated by the ―Big Four‖ state-
owned banks (Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of 
China, and China Construction Bank), which together account for about three-fifths of the 
market in 2005 (Standard & Poor’s, 2005). The Big Four face little competitive threat and seem 
to be better known for their inadequate risk control than their contribution to the economy, which 
is due to the legacy of years of forced policy and political lending to unprofitable state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). It should be noted that La Porta et al. (2002) find that government ownership 
of banks is rather prevalent around the world and that it is often associated with subsequent 
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lower productivity and development, consistent with ―political‖ theories of government 
ownership. 
In 1998 the government issued a special bond worth US$33 billion and injected the raised 
capital into the banks. In 1999–2000 the state established four asset management companies 
(AMCs) and transferred US$170 billion of non-performing loans to them for debt-for-equity 
swaps. However, bad loans continue to grow despite the efforts of the government. Overall, these 
facts suggest that recapitalizing banks and selling off bad loans seems unlikely to be enough 
without improving governance. 
These problems mainly derive from the politicization and socialization of the state 
banking system. State-owned banks are expected to support a wide range of political and social 
activities, are directed by multiple principals, and operate under a number of constraints. This 
institutional arrangement might lead to time inconsistency problem (Kydland and Prescott, 1977) 
and the inconsistency across discretionary policies over time lends itself to abuse for political 
and social objectives. It could also lead to the absence of credible financial discipline and easy 
access to government funds. In such a set-up, managers might elect to take excessive risk. 
  
2.3.2 Distinctive characteristics of corporate governance in Chinese banks 
Many listed companies are still owned by various layers of governmental agencies and 
state enterprises. The newly listed firms face two important institutional constraints: (1) 
government-controlled shares and assets are prohibited to be sold to the public, and (2) 
government maintains the ultimate decision right on the appointment of chief executive officers 
(CEOs). These might lead to lower degree of board independence. Moreover, the tradable shares 
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are widely held by individual investors, which make it difficult for minority tradable 
shareholders to take an active part in corporate governance.   
A second characteristic is that state shareholding incurs some principal-agency problems. 
Due to the non-transferability of the state owned shares and assets, the government and 
politicians cannot benefit from any efficiency improvement of the firm by freely selling off some 
of the state ownership. Because total firm value is hard to measure when most of its shares are 
non-transferable, the wealth of the politician depends on a set of macroeconomic and political 
factors rather than the firm performance, and it is important for the politician to improve the 
employment rate and the fiscal conditions of the region, building relationships (perhaps through 
trading favors with colleagues and superiors), and so on. Achieving these objectives may 
increase the politician’s incomes and promotion opportunities, but it can reduce the efficiency 
and value of the enterprise (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
The third one is the problem of insider control, potentially more serious for Chinese 
banks for three reasons. First, excessive concentration of non-tradable shareholdings leads to the 
lack of both hostile takeover and proxy contests, which facilitates management entrenchment. 
Second, it is less likely for widely dispersed tradable shareholders to monitor sufficiently and 
this tends to increase insider discretion. Third, the appointment and evaluation of management 
are often determined by the controlling shareholders, which may result in rent-seeking behavior 
and collusion between the controlling shareholders and management.  It should be noted that 
managerial ownership is extraordinarily low in Chinese banks. The average proportion of 
ownership in the hands of management, directors, and supervisors was 0.000543 percent in 2005 
and 0.00174 percent in 2006. Neither long-term, equity-based programs nor performance-based 
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compensation programs are widely put into practice. The incentive alignment between the 
shareholders and management arguably is inadequate. 
On the performance effect of corporate governance for Chinese banks, Wang and 
Kumbhakar (2007) find that joint-holding firms perform better than wholly-stated-owned banks. 
However, there is no corresponding research on the board structure.  
Overall, the governance of Chinese banks has several problems. Therefore, we expect a 
generally weaker relation between board structure and performance for Chinese banks compared 
to the US. 
 
3. Expected relation between board structure and performance 
Linck, Netter and Yang (2008) point out three important aspects of board structure: board 
independence, board size, and board leadership. Consequently, these three variables are the focus 
of this research. The following gives a more detailed review of related studies, from which we 
form our expectations. 
 
3.1 Board Independence 
Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that more outside directors increase a board’s 
monitoring effectiveness. A number of studies on the proportion of outside directors find a 
positive relation between the abnormal returns associated with outside board membership (Byrd 
and Hickman, 1992; De Andres et al., 2005; Rosentein and Wyatt, 1997)
16
. 
For the case of Chinese banks, due to the dominance of the largest shareholders in 
Chinese listed banks, the ratio of independent directors on a board may be of particular 
                                                 
16
 Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), however, find no relation between the percentage of outside directors and the 
general level of firm performance as measured by Tobin’s Q. 
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importance, and might help to test indirectly the level of board independence. However, because 
the CEO or chairman has discretion to select members of the board, many of the independent 
directors may be actually friends of management, that is, many ―independent‖ directors are not 
really independent. The press has reported on a number of cases in which independent directors 
did nothing to resolve a conflict between insiders and minority shareholders.  
We adopt another proxy for independence: state ownership. The degree of ownership 
concentration affects the nature of contracting. For example, when the ownership is diffuse in the 
U.S., agency problems come mainly from the conflict of interest between outside shareholders 
and managers. However, in Asia, the ownership is concentrated, the nature of the agency 
problem shifts away from manager-shareholder conflicts toward conflicts between the large 
shareholder and minority shareholders. As mentioned above, because of the dominant control of 
the non-tradable state owned shares in the Chinese banks, their management is likely affected by 
politicization and socialization, and the government takes a large role in Chinese bank corporate 
governance.  
 Given the above discussion, if outside directors are independent, then there should be a 
positive relationship between the proportion of independent members on the board of directors 
and bank performances. Moreover, state-owned banks or banks with CEO/COB duality tend to 
perform poorer than other banks.    
 
3.2 Board Size 
Board size may affect the ability of bank boards to function effectively. Resource 
dependence theory has been one foundation for the perspective: larger boards are associated with 
higher levels of firm performance (Goodstein et al., 1994). In their view, board size may be a 
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measure of an organization's ability to form environmental links to secure critical resources. 
Increased board size also gives rise to a larger pool of expertise and counsel for entity decision-
making. A larger board size may be particularly beneficial for banks due to relation banking. For 
example, it is not uncommon for a large customer to sit on the board. Indeed, compared to other 
industries, banking is special for its typically larger size of board. For a typical corporation, 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) propose an optimum board size of around 7 or 8 directors. Using a 
sample of US non-financial firms, Yermack (1996) finds that the mean of board members is 
about 12. In contrast for banks, Adams and Mehram (2008) document bigger boards of the US 
banking sample, with a mean of 17.97 during the period 1986 and 1999.  
Nevertheless, researchers have far from achieving consensus on the optimal board size. 
Firstenberg and Malkiel (1994) argue that a board with eight or fewer members "engenders 
greater focus, participation, and genuine interaction and debate". Increased board size over a 
level, however, also carries disadvantages. Although a board’s capacity for monitoring increases 
as more directors are added, the benefit may be outweighed by the incremental cost of poorer 
communication and decision-making associated with larger groups (Jensen, 1993; John and 
Senbet, 1998). Larger board size may also decrease the ability to control management, thereby 
leading to agency problems stemming from the separation of management and control (Jensen, 
1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). 
John and Senbet (1998) survey the empirical and theoretical literature on corporate 
boards of directors and conclude a negative relationship between board size and firm 
performance. For banks, however, Adams and Mehran (2008) find no negative board size effect. 
Based on this study, we expect the relation to be non-negative. Also based on the above studies, 
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it is possible that performance and board size may be non-linearly related.  Therefore, as a 
robustness check, we will include the square of board size in the analysis. 
 
3.3 Leadership 
CEO/Chair duality concentrates management’s power and board leadership in one 
person’s hands (Jensen, 1993) and this concentration of power might exacerbate potential 
conflicts of interest, and result in less effective monitoring of the CEO (Brickley et al., 1997; 
Miyajima et al., 2003). We expect this also applies to the banking industry; that is, we expect a 
negative relationship between CEO/chair duality and bank performance. 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Sample Selection  
As a comparative study, it is desirable to have roughly equal number of comparable 
banks in the two countries. Since the number of traded bank stocks is smaller in China than that 
in the U.S., we start with the collection of Chinese bank data. The Chinese data come from 
BANKSCOPE and the official websites of Chinese banks. Due to the lack of data for small local 
banks, the sample includes 106 Chinese banks that represent more than 80% of the assets 
between 2002 and 2006 on average. There are three reasons to choose the post-2002 era. First, 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was enacted in 2002, and we want to keep regulatory atmosphere 
about the same. Second, the period before 2000 has been examined by Adams and Mehran 
(2008). Third, many Chinese banks were not publicly traded before this period.  
The Chinese banks include three types of banks: publicly listed state-owned banks (Big 
Four), corporate commercial banks, and city commercial banks, the primary Chinese sample 
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include 53 publicly traded banks among the 106 initial largest banks (in terms of book value of 
assets) for each year 2002-2006. We chose a relatively small set of banks for our original sample 
because it is time consuming to collect detailed internal governance variables and because we 
need bank performance data that is unlikely to be available for small banks. However, this 
sample is representative since the assets of our sample banks a large fraction of total industry 
assets (76.3% of total Chinese banking assets in 2002 and 52.5% in 2008). The comparable US 
sample is obtained for the same period using the sources COMPUTSTAT, Federal Reserve at 
Chicago website, and RISK METRICS. The sample includes 74 banks among the 144 largest 
publicly traded ones; some of omitted due to the unavailability of governance data
17
.   
 
4.2 Empirical Model 
We adopt a regression approach given below, followed by a description of the variables. 
 
ititit ControlvernanceInternalGoeMeasurePerformanc 210                     
    Where:       the subscript i represents i
th
 bank and t denotes time. 
 
iteMeasurePerformanc  includes four types of bank performance variables:  
            Profit Measure: Return on Asset (ROA)  
            Valuation Measure: Tobin’s Q; 
            Cost Measure: Cost/Asset;  
            Loan Measure: Loan Loss Reserve/Gross Loan. 
                                                 
17
 
There might be some potential problems in terms of data. In particular, the financial data in China may be 
unreliable. In the environment of weak bank supervision in China, the financial data reported by banks to the 
supervisory agency are likely to be noisy. The governance data may also be problematic. For example, it is hard to 
identify truly independent directors.   
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itvernanceInternalGo  is a vector of board governance variables:  
           Board Size (BS);  
           Board Independence (OUT = number of outside directors / total number of directors); 
           Bank Ownership (OWN = 0 if the percent of state ownership is < 5%, 0 otherwise; 
alternatively, the actual government ownership is used); 
             Leadership (LEA is a dummy variable that equals 1 if CEO is also COB). 
 
itControl is a vector of control variables that include the log of size of the bank (ln(SZ)), the 
Growth Opportunity (GROWOPP = Capital Expenditures / total sale) and Capital Ratio 
(CAPRATIO = Capital / Total Assets). 
 
As reviewed earlier, some studies suggest a non-linearity of the board size effect. 
Therefore, we add a square term of board size to measure the effect of the board size on banking 
performance. At the last section, we explore the relationship between governance and subsequent 
performance of banks to account for the possibility of endorgeneity of corporate governance.  
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
As mentioned earlier, we compute four performance variables, board governance 
variables, and additional control variables available in our data for both US and China. Their 
descriptions and data sources are presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Data Descriptions and  Sources 
 
Data Type Variables Descriptions Sources 
US: 
  
Governance Variables: 
 
Risk Metrics  
& 
 www.sec.com 
(Financial Reports 10-K) 
Board Size 
(BS) 
The total number directors of the board 
 
 
Outside Director 
(OUT) 
Number of outside directors/total number of directors 
 
 
Leadership 
(LEA) 
A dummy variable that equals to 1 if CEO is also COB 
 
 
Block ownership 
(OWN) 
 
 
OWN=0 if the percent of bank state ownership is < 5%, 
Otherwise, the actual government ownership is used. 
 
Performance Variables: 
 
COMPUSTAT & CRSP ROA Return on Assets 
Tobin's Q 
 
 
Total assets  minus the book value of equity 
plus to the market value of equity /total assets 
Cost Measure Cost/assets 
 
Loan Measure Loan loss allowance/gross loan 
 
Control Variables: 
 
lnSize log of total assets 
 
Growth Opportunity 
(GrowOpp) 
Capital expenditures/sales 
 
 
Capital Ratio 
(CapRatio) 
Equity/total assets 
 
 
China: 
 
Share Type 
 
 
A dummy variable: it equals to 1 if banks issue B or 
H shares, 0 otherwise. 
Other variables are measured same with the US's. 
Bankscope 
China Banking Regulatory 
Commission(www.cbrc.gov.cn) 
and China Security Regulatory 
Commission (www.csrc.gov.cn) 
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Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on governance measures, performance measures, and 
control variables for US banks (panel A) and Chinese banks (panel B). This table reports all 
variables for the years 2002-2006 for the sample of 74 US banks and 53 Chinese ones. 
 
Table2: Descriptive Statistics 
The table shows summary statistics for selected financial variables, board size and board composition and control 
variables for our sample of US and Chinese banks from 2002 -2006. Panel A is for US sample and panel B is for 
China. The sample includes 74 US banks and 53 Chinese banks. 
Panel A: US Obs Mean Median Min Max St   Std. Dev 
Independent Variables (Governance) 
Board Size 74 16.25 15 7 31 4.93 
Independent Directors (in %) 74 53.66 82.15 50 94.77 12.21 
Leadership 74 0.57 1 0 1 0.45 
Block Ownership (in %) 74 9.34 7.52 2.33 83.45 14.89 
 
Dependent Variables (Performance) 
ROA (in %) 74 1.23 1.27 -1.67 4.32 0.52 
Tobin's Q 74 1.07 1.06 0.91 1.80 0.06 
Cost Measure 74 0.27 0.16 0.07 2.41 0.56 
Loan Measure 74 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03 
 
Control Variables       
lnSize 74 7.36 6.88 0.45 14.50 1.99 
GrowOpp 74 0.12 0.07 0.00 0.85 0.44 
CapRatio 74 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.23 0.03 
       
Panel B: CHINA Obs Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev 
 
Independent Variables(Governance) 
Board Size 53 8.78 10 5 17 3.68 
Independent Directors (in %) 53 29.27 20.57 0 54.71 10.33 
Leadership 53 0.68 1 0 1 0.31 
Block Ownership (in %) 53 43.26 12.76 0 100 34.99 
 
Dependent Variables (Performance) 
ROA (in %) 53 0.38 0.28 -0.19 0.79 0.15 
Tobin's Q 53 0.85 0.97 0.54 1.44 0.08 
Cost Measure 53 0.30 0.29 0.15 0.62 0.36 
Loan Measure 53 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 
 
Control Variables       
lnSize 53 5.37 4.31 0.24 10.78 1.58 
GrowOpp 53 0.40 0.23 0.09 1.45 0.98 
CapRatio 53 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.19 0.06 
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Governance Variables  
We first focus on the governance variables. The board size is 16.25 on average in US and 
8.78 in China during the period of 2002-2006. As Adams and Mehran (2008) and Hayes, Mehran, 
and Schaefer (2005) also document, US financial firms in the period of 1986-1999 have on 
average larger boards than manufacturing firms. As in with their studies, our results suggest that 
the board size of banking tends to be large. Although Chinese banks’ average board size is about 
half of that in the US, the average board size of Chinese banks is still larger than that of non-
financial publicly listed firms in China. Based on the data from China Security regulatory 
Commission
18
, the average board size of all listed companies is 6.2 during the years 2002-2006. 
It seems safe to conclude that banks tend to have larger boards of directors than nonbanking 
firms both in US and in China.  
Regarding the proportion of outsiders on the board, we find a 53.66% for US sample and 
29.27% % for China. The 53.66% of outsiders in US is close to the 54% in Yermack (1999) but 
substantially lower than 69% found in Adams and Mehran (2008)
19
. Based on these results, the 
independence of Chinese banking boards is obviously weaker than that of US, and this might be 
due to the higher proportion of state ownership among Chinese banks and their relatively poorer 
governance. Additionally, US banks have lower leadership and block ownership than Chinese 
banks
20
, which implies that the dual-role of CEO and CHB is more popular in Chinese bank 
management and the ownership distribution is more diverse in US banks.  
 
                                                 
18
 Its website is www.csrc.gov.cn. 
19
 Adams and Mehran (2008) use a stricter classification of independent outsider than other studies: a director is not 
an outsider if he was an officer or had any business relationship with the bank-holding companies in any of the 14 
years of their sample time between 1986 and 1999. The traditional classification of directors is based on current 
employee status or business relationships. For our samples, we employ the traditional cross-sectional studies’ 
classification of outsiders because detailed data on lending relationships is unavailable.  
20
 The average leadership (a dummy variable equals 1 if the CEO is the COB) is 0.57 in US versus 0.68 in China, 
and the average block ownership is 9.34% in the US vs. 43.26% in China.  
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Performance Variables 
The performances are much higher in the US than in China during 2002-2006: the 
average/median ROA is 1.297%/1.274% in US and 0.375% /0.281% in China. Similarly, Tobin’s 
Q is higher in the US (mean = 1.07) than in China (mean = 0.85). The cost measure and loan loss 
measure are lower in the US; the average cost measure (ratio of cost to assets) is 0.27 in the US 
and that in China is 0.30, and the average loan loss is 0.02 in the US and 0.03 in China. While we 
do not show them in the tables, there are several trends that are noteworthy, particularly trends in 
performance and firm size.  For Chinese banks, ROA and Tobin’s Q have shown an upward 
trend which might be induced by the Chinese banking reformation and capitalization of Chinese 
banking industry in 2002, while ROA and Tobin’s Q of US banks fluctuate from 2002 to 2006. 
On the other hand, firm sizes for both countries are increasing during our sample period, 
reflecting the increased consolidation in the banking industry not only in US but also in China. 
An average US sample firm is US$101.3 billion of assets in 2002 and increases in size to 
US$174.9 billion of assets in 2006, whereas an average Chinese sample firm is US$21.8 billion 
of assets in 2002 and increases in size to US$60.4 billion of assets in 2006; the average growth 
rate in US is 17% versus 29% in China during the period from 2002 to 2006.  
 
Control Variables 
Bank size may be one important element of performance as banks may enjoy economics 
of scale in financial operations and in adoption of corporate governance norms. We measure firm 
size by the logarithm of total assets; on average, the US bank size is higher than that in China. 
We also control for growth opportunities, as banks with higher growing opportunities might 
achieve better performance even if their governance is not ideal. To the end, we use the ratio of 
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capital expenditures to sales to proxy for growth opportunities. Chinese banks have higher 
growth opportunities although their standard deviation is much larger than US.  Another control 
variable is the capital ratio (equals the ratio of equity to total Assets). US banks’ capital ratio is 
higher than Chinese banks on average (0.092 in US versus 0.061 in China), and Chinese banks’ 
capital ratio has a greater standard deviation (0.025 in US versus 0.057 in China).  
In sum, banks in China operate less efficiently than those in US based on all four 
measures of performance - ROA, Tobin’s Q, cost, and loan management, and the variations in 
Chinese banks’ variables tend to be greater. On average, US banks have a larger board size and 
higher percentage of outside directors than Chinese banks. Additionally, US banks are less likely 
to have a dual CEO/COB and to have a concentrated ownership. 
Table 3 presents the correlations between board governance and performance variables 
(panel A for the US and panel B for China). In the US, ROA and Tobin’s Q are significantly 
correlated with governance variables – board size and the percentage of outsiders, while cost 
measure is insignificantly but positively correlated with board size. In China, the correlations 
between performances and governance are insignificant except for a negative relation between  
 
Table 3: Correlations between board governance and bank performance in the US and in China 
The table presents correlations between board governance variables and bank performance for the US and Chinese 
samples. The sample contains 74 US banks and 53 Chinese banks between 2002 and 2006. Panel A is for US sample 
and panel B is for China. Table 1 describes the sample and the variables.  Significance levels: (***) – 1%, (**)-5%, 
(*)-10%. 
Panel A. Governance and Performance in US 
     
 
BS 
 
LEA OWN ROA 
Tobin's 
Q 
Cost 
Measure 
Loan 
Measure OUT 
BS 1.00 0.02 -0.15 0.18* -0.12** 0.10* 0.08* -0.07 
OUT 
 
1.00 -0.06 -0.03 0.05* 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 
LEA 
 
 1.00 0.09* -0.02 0.00 0.06 0.03 
OWN 
 
 
 
1.00 -0.08* -0.01 0.05 0.04 
ROA 
 
 
  
1.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 
Tobin's Q 
 
 
   
1.00 -0.06 -0.02 
Cost Measure 
 
 
    
1.00 0.03 
Loan Measure 
 
 
     
1.00 
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Panel B. Governance and Performance in China 
    
 
BS 
 
LEA OWN ROA 
Tobin's 
Q 
Cost 
Measure 
Loan 
Measure OUT 
BS 1.00 0.04 -0.05 0.15* -0.11 0.09 -0.04 -0.07 
OUT 
 
1.00 -0.04 -0.09 0.09 0.13 -0.07 -0.02 
LEA 
 
 1.00 0.21* -0.11 -0.08 0.11 0.07 
OWN 
 
 
 
1.00 -0.14* -0.15* 0.11 0.13 
ROA 
 
 
  
1.00 0.02 -0.07 -0.05 
Tobin's Q 
 
 
   
1.00 -0.04 -0.07 
Cost Measure 
 
 
    
1.00 0.06 
Loan Measure 
 
 
     
1.00 
 
block ownership and ROA and between block ownership and Tobin’s Q. Therefore, the 
correlation analysis suggests a general weaker association between performance and governance 
in China than that in the US. 
 
5.2. Corporate Governance and Contemporaneous Performance 
In this section, we discuss the regression analysis of the relation between governance and 
bank performance, as measured by ROA in Table 4, Tobin’s Q in Table 5, cost measure in Table 
6, and loan measure in Table 7. For each table, five different regressions are performed: each of 
the first four regressions includes just one board structure variable, specifically board size and its 
square term in column 1, board composition in column 2, leadership in column 3, and ownership 
in column 4; then in column 5, all four board structure variables are included in the same 
regression. The purpose of this is to assess the robustness of results.  
 
ROA as the Measure of Bank Performance 
Table 4 shows the regression results with ROA as the dependent variable. For both 
countries, board size is negatively related with ROA although the relation is significant for the 
US sample only. For US banks, the coefficient of the square of board size is significantly 
negative, again suggesting that larger boards are not beneficial in terms of ROA. For Chinese  
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Table 4: Regression Analysis - ROA as the Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is ROA, and the independent variables are board size (column I), the proportion of outside 
directors (II), leadership (III), block ownership proportion (IV), and all four (V). The sample contains 74 US banks and 
53 Chinese banks between 2002 and 2006. Panel A is for the US sample and panel B is for China. Table 1 describes the 
sample and the variables. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance levels: (***) – 1%, (**) -5%, (*) -10%. 
Panel A: US ROA 
Governance Variables I II III IV V 
Board Size -0.001* 
   
-0.001** 
 
(-1.577) 
   
(-2.374) 
Board Size
2
 -0.003** 
   
-0.000** 
 
(2.248) 
   
(2.957) 
Independent Directors 
 
-0.000 
  
-0.000 
  
(-0.053) 
  
(-0.834) 
Leadership 
  
0.007 
 
0.006 
   
(0.038) 
 
(0.483) 
Block Ownership 
   
0.005 0.003 
                 
  
(0.382) (0.589) 
Control Variables 
     lnSize 0.004* 0.007* 0.006* 0.004* 0.004* 
 
(-1.877) (1.842) (1.962) (1.932) (1.837) 
GrowOpp -0.031 -0.025 -0.047 -0.035 -0.033 
 
(0.034) (0.032) (0.048) (0.028) (0.088) 
CapRatio 0.003** 0.005** 0.004** 0.006 0.004*** 
 
(-2.857) (-2.233) (2.493) (1.258) (2.936) 
     Intercept 3.255*** 8.496*** 5.051*** 5.034*** 7.392*** 
 
(-12.513) (5.362) (-7.473) (4.055) (-21.589) 
R
2
 0.767 0.791 0.782 0.803 0.802 
F-statistic 43.803 41.553 47.638 40.452 38.349 
 
 
 Panel B: CHINA ROA 
Governance Variables I II III IV V 
Board Size -0.001 
   
-0.001 
 
(-1.022) 
   
(0.576) 
Board Size
2
 0.000 
   
0.000 
 
(-1.217) 
   
(-1.169) 
Independent Directors 
 
0.000 
  
0.001 
  
(-0.016) 
  
(-0.037) 
Leadership 
  
0.001 
 
0.001** 
   
(2.015) 
 
(2.493) 
Block Ownership 
   
-0.053* -0.046* 
    
(-2.173) (-2.012) 
Control Variables 
     lnSize 0.001 0.001* 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.159) (1.938) (0.175) (0.094) (0.182) 
GrowOpp -0.008 -0.003 -0.003 -0.052 -0.002 
 
(0.492) (0.827) (0.329) (0.155) (0.937) 
CapRatio 0.000 0.002* 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 
(-0.983) (-1.937) (-0.382) (-0.739) (-1.392) 
Intercept 4.692** 2.359*** 0.934*** 2.023** 5.0322** 
 
(4.793) (2.948) (3.284) (2.945) (3.194) 
R
2
 0.739 0.784 0.803 0.797 0.783 
F-statistic 29.472 33.595 42.390 39.579 37.544 
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banks, the correlation between block ownership and ROA is negative. This result is not 
surprising, since the block ownership in China often is government ownership and government 
ownership has been shown to be associated with poor performances by some previous studies. 
The leadership variable is insignificant when it is the only governance variable (regression III). 
However, it is significantly positive when it is included with other governance variables 
(regression V). Note that Table 3 also indicates a positive relation between leadership and block 
ownership. The positive relation is contrary to our expectation: if duality of CEO/Chairman 
suggests entrenched managers, then performance is expected to be poor. Thus we cannot offer a 
satisfactory explanation for the result on the leadership variable. As for the control variables, 
both size and capital are positively related to performance, especially for the US sample.     
 
Tobin’s Q as the Measure of Bank Performance 
The regression results using Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable are displayed in Table 5. 
For the US sample, Tobin’s Q is significantly positively related with board size, which is 
strikingly different from that in Table 4. Here the results imply a larger board size enhances 
performances while the result in the previous table suggests that a larger board lowers ROA. It is 
hard to reconcile the differences. However, it should be noted that our result regarding Tobin’s Q 
is consistent with that in Admans and Mehran (2008). Also noteworthy is that the board size is 
significant only when it is the only governance variable, not when it is included along with other 
governance variables. The evidence for the square of board size is clearer, significantly positive 
in both cases. The relation between block ownership and performance in either the US or China 
is negative. As in Table 4, the coefficients of size and capital ratio are positive.  
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Table 5: Regression Analysis - Tobin's Q as the Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q, and the independent variables are board size (column I), the proportion of outside 
directors (II), leadership (III), block ownership proportion (IV), and all four (V). The sample contains 74 US banks and 53 
Chinese banks between 2002 and 2006. Panel A is for US sample and panel B is for China. Table 1 describes the sample 
and the variables. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance levels: (***) – 1%, (**) -5%, (*) -10%. 
Panel A : US Tobin's Q 
Governance Variables I II III IV V 
Board Size 0.000* 
   
0.003 
 
(1.948) 
   
(0.739) 
Board Size
2
 0.001** 
   
0.001* 
 
(2.539) 
   
(-1.883) 
Independent Directors 
 
0.000 
  
0.000 
  
(-0.173) 
  
(-.0184) 
Leadership 
  
0.004 
 
0.004* 
   
(-0.794) 
 
(-1.938) 
Block Ownership 
   
-0.001** -0.001** 
    
(-1.947) (-1.849) 
Control Variables 
     
lnSize 0.003* 0.004* 0.002 0.003 0.004*** 
 
(1.839) (2.492) (0.146) (0.158) (2.947) 
GrowOpp -0.079 -0.092 -0.104 -0.092 -0.067 
 
(0.215) (0.482) (0.322) (0.219) (0.189) 
CapRatio 0.003** 0.003*** 0.002* 0.003* 0.003*** 
 
(3.928) (4.958) (3.211) (2.947) (2.849) 
Intercept 2.391*** 1.021*** 1.536*** 1.522*** 1.294*** 
 
(24.293) (27.382) (10.326) (24.399) (4.929) 
R
2
 0.828 0.792 0.823 0.821 0.793 
F-statistic 35.392 40.104 37.206 26.490 36.928 
      
  
Panel B: CHINA Tobin's Q 
Governance Variables I II III IV V 
Board Size -0.001 
   
-0.001 
 
(0.292) 
   
(-1.628) 
Board Size
2
 0.001 
   
0.001 
 
(0.938) 
   
(0.892) 
Independent Directors 
 
0.000 
  
0.000 
  
(0.012) 
  
(0.385) 
Leadership 
  
0.001 
 
0.001 
   
(0.184) 
 
(0.145) 
Block Ownership 
   
-0.015 -0.013* 
    
(1.038) (2.248) 
Control Variables 
     
lnSize 0.001 0.001* 0.002 0.001 0.001* 
 
(0.849) (-1.789) (-0.004) (0.494) (1.849) 
GrowOpp -0.021 -0.014 -0.055 -0.084 -0.037 
 
(0.794) (1.023) (0.599) (0.729) (0.493) 
CapRatio 0.003* 0.004* 0.001 0.002* 0.003 
 
(2.123) (1.894) (0.158) (1.923) (1.684) 
Intercept -0.382** 0.822*** 0.949*** 0.692*** 0.502*** 
 
(5.925) (-2.849) (6.877) (5.083) (3.474) 
R
2
 0.879 0.894 0.744 0.860 0.878 
F-statistic 20.329 16.930 38.039 22.493 20.583 
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 Cost as the Measure of Bank Performance 
We then turn to cost control and use cost as a proxy for bank performance. Table 6 
presents the results. For the US sample, both the coefficients of board size and square of board 
size are significant negative. This is in agreement with the results with Tobin’s Q: larger boards 
tend to be associated with better performances. As for the Chinese sample, there is no significant 
relation between performance and bank governance.  
Table 6: Regression Analysis - Cost Measure as the Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable is the cost measure, and the independent variables are board size (column I), the proportion 
of outside directors (II), leadership (III), block ownership proportion (IV), and all four (V). The sample contains 74 
US banks and 53 Chinese banks between 2002 and 2006. Panel A is for US sample and panel B is for China. Table 1 
describes the sample and the variables. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance levels: (***) – 1%, (**) -
5%, (*) -10%. 
Panel A: US Cost Measure 
Governance Variables I II III IV V 
Board Size -0.001* 
   
-0.001** 
 
(2.014) 
   
(-2.439) 
Board Size
2
 -0.001*** 
   
-0.002* 
 
(2.943) 
   
(-1.927) 
Independent Directors 
 
0.000 
  
0.000 
  
(0.669) 
  
(0.813) 
Leadership 
  
0.033 
 
0.028 
   
(0.849) 
 
(0.693) 
Block Ownership 
   
-0.001 -0.002* 
    
(0.492) (1.849) 
Control Variables 
    lnSize 0.016* 0.153 0.019 0.017 0.023 
 
(1.882) (0.394) (0.015) (0.097) (1.029) 
GrowOpp -0.048 -0.063 -0.079 -0.036 -0.049 
 
(0.195) (0.115) (0.184) (0.284) (0.185) 
CapRatio 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004* 0.004*** 
 
(3.286) (2.849) (5.295) (2.012) (3.292) 
Intercept -0.392*** -0.843*** -0.364*** 1.894*** -0.492** 
 
(3.494) (5.320) (2.849) (3.212) (-2.524) 
R
2
 0.873 0.836 0.738 0.732 0.802 
F-statistic 11.480 20.739 28.533 28.930 22.495 
  
  Panel B: CHINA Cost Measure 
Governance Variables I II III IV V 
Board Size -0.002 
   
-0.003 
 
(0.839) 
   
(0.973) 
Board Size
2
 -0.011 
   
-0.009 
 
(0.894) 
   
(1.028) 
Independent Directors 
 
-0.001 
  
-0.003 
  
(0.183) 
  
(1.212) 
Leadership 
  
0.003 
 
0.002 
   
(1.023) 
 
(1.029) 
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Block Ownership 
   
-0.005 -0.008 
    
(0.194) (0.193) 
Control Variables 
     lnSize 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.002 
 
(0.948) (1.029) (0.038) (0.391) (0.184) 
GrowOpp -0.006 -0.005 -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 
 
(1.001) (0.984) (0.028) (-0.739) (-1.039) 
CapRatio 0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 
(0.894) (1.930) (0.592) (0.738) (0.482) 
Intercept -1.090*** 0.075*** 0.022*** 0.094*** 0.713*** 
 
(2.920) (2.948) (3.119) (5.292) (5.898) 
R
2
 0.792 0.842 0.585 0.589 0.729 
F-statistic 40.382 32.482 14.719 14.753 43.401 
 
Loan Loss as the Measure of Bank Performance 
Table 7 reports the regression coefficients when the dependent variable is the loan loss 
measure. Since loan loss represents a major cost, the US results here are consistent with those in 
Table 6: larger boards tend to be associated with lower loan losses. For the Chinese sample, the 
results again indicate no significant relation between performance and governance variables.  
 
Table 7: Regression Analysis - Loan Measure as the Dependent Variable  
The dependent variable is the loan measure, and the independent variables are board size (column I), the proportion 
of outside directors (II), leadership (III), block ownership proportion (IV), and all four (V). The sample contains 74 
US banks and 53 Chinese banks between 2002 and 2006. Panel A is for the US sample and panel B is for China. 
Table 1 describes the sample and the variables. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance levels: (***) – 
1%, (**) -5%, (*) -10%. 
Panel A: US Loan Measure 
Governance Variables I II III IV V 
Board Size -0.001* 
   
-0.026 
 
(1.808) 
   
(0.296) 
Board Size
2
 -0.001** 
   
-0.021 
 
(2.355) 
   
(0.123) 
Independent Directors 
 
0.000 
  
0.000 
  
(0.119) 
  
(0.186) 
Leadership 
  
0.029 
 
0.018 
   
(0.482) 
 
(0.381) 
Block Ownership 
   
-0.000 -0.001 
    
(0.014) (0.359) 
Control Variables 
     lnSize 0.033* 0.000 0.023 0.045 0.069 
 
(1.847) (0.849) (0.936) (1.039) (0.938) 
GrowOpp -0.011 -0.032 -0.062 -0.009 -0.009 
 
(0.899) (-0.724) (-1.423) (-1.321) (-0.856) 
CapRatio 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002** 0.002*** 
 
(4.206) (2.893) (5.811) (2.509) (3.201) 
R
2
 0.803 0.821 0.793 0.784 0.794 
F-statistic 28.406 27.493 30.019 31.456 30.593 
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Panel B: CHINA Loan Measure 
Governance Variables I II III IV V 
Board Size -0.001 
   
-0.001 
 
(0.144) 
   
(0.184) 
Board Size
2
 -0.031 
   
-0.053 
 
(0.169) 
   
(0.426) 
Independent Directors 
 
0.000 
  
0.000 
  
(0.049) 
  
(0.492) 
Leadership 
  
0.001 
 
0.002 
   
(0.467) 
 
(0.329) 
Block Ownership 
   
-0.001 -0.000 
    
(0.482) (0.141) 
Control Variables 
     lnSize 0.007 0.009 0.005 0.006 0.007 
 
(0.395) (0.944) (0.048) (0.983) (1.035) 
GrowOpp -0.018 -0.006 -0.031 -0.019 -0.023 
 
(0.943) (0.135) (0.482) (0.948) (1.021) 
CapRatio 0.000 0.002* 0.000 0.002 0.002 
 
(0.837) (1.830) (0.849) (0.849) (1.029) 
Intercept 1.046** 0.194*** 0.593*** 0.948*** 0.713*** 
 
(1.948) (2.596) (3.011) (2.506) (2.995) 
R
2
 0.730 0.792 0.797 0.749 0.788 
F-statistic 39.323 30.887 29.038 34.201 29.335 
 
An Alternative Test and Discussion of Overall Regression Results 
Because our results to this point are mixed and because some independent variables may 
not be exogenous, we perform an alternative test; namely, the lagged values instead of current 
values of independent variables are used and the results are shown in Table 8. Notably for the US 
sample, some previous significant results are no longer significant here. Specifically, the positive 
coefficient of board size in Table 5 (where Tobin’s Q is the dependent variable) is no longer 
significant and in fact turns negative; also, the significance of board size in Table 7 (where loan 
loss is the dependent variable) is reduced. The governance variables that are significant in both 
tests are as follows. There is evidence for a negative relation between ROA and board size and a 
negative relation between costs and board size. The troubling point about the two results is that 
they have contrary implications for board size. That is, the evidence indicates that, on the one 
hand, larger boards tend to be associated with worse performance; on the other, larger boards 
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Table 8: Regression analysis with lagged independent variables 
The table shows regression estimates; the dependent variables are performance variables while the independent 
variables and control variables are lagged values. The sample contains 74 US banks and 53 Chinese banks from 
2002-2006. Significance levels: (***) – 1%, (**) -5%, (*) -10%. 
Panel A: US Performance Variables  
Governance Variables  ROA Tobin's Q Cost Measure Loan Measure 
Board Size -0.001* -0.001 -0.001** -0.104 
 
(2.095) (0.783) (2.407) (0.407) 
Board Size
2
 -0.001** -0.000 -0.002* -0.083 
 
(2.384) (-0.978) (-1.927) (0.723) 
Independent Directors -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(-0.285) (0.677) (0.542) (0.465) 
Leadership 0.004 0.002 0.042 0.027 
 
(0.906) (0.377) (0.497) (0.731) 
Block Ownership 0.001 -0.001** -0.004* -0.001 
 
(1.033) (-2.395) (1.648) (0.846) 
Control Variables  
    lnSize 0.003* 0.004*** 0.019 0.052 
 
(2.053) (3.846) (0.637) (1.046) 
GrowOpp -0.034* -0.033* -0.062** -0.009* 
 
(-2.037) (-2.129) (-2.423) (-1.821) 
CapRatio 0.003*** 0.003** 0.004*** 0.002** 
 
(5.947) (2.274) (4.362) (2.635) 
Intercept 5.498*** 1.938*** -3.512*** 1.894*** 
 
(95.765) (80.363) (30.466) (30.734) 
R
2
 0.785 0.740 0.792 0.743 
F-statistic 26.368 38.435 27.305 33.940 
  Panel B: CHINA Performance Variables  
Governance Variables  ROA Tobin's Q Cost Measure Loan Measure 
Board Size -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 
 
(0.787) (1.628) (0.074) (0.275) 
Board Size
2
 0.000 0.000 -0.010 -0.053 
 
(0.927) (0.935) (1.634) (0.699) 
Independent Directors 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001 
 
(0.385) (0.007) (1.734) (0.262) 
Leadership 0.001* 0.001 0.003 0.001 
 
(2.166) (0.025) (0.107) (0.157) 
Block Ownership -0.037* -0.062* -0.006 -0.001 
 
(2.036) (2.028) (0.723) (0.103) 
Control Variables  
    lnSize 0.001 0.001* 0.003 0.009 
 
(0.281) (1.923) (0.002) (0.396) 
GrowOpp -0.0075* -0.052 -0.008 -0.015 
 
(1.948) (0.489) (0.813) (-1.045) 
CapRatio 0.000* 0.004** -0.000*** 0.002* 
 
(1.934) (1.976) (3.019) (1.934) 
Intercept -3.759*** 0.497*** 0.021** 0.644*** 
 
(3.452) (2.492) (2.179) (2.748) 
R
2
 0.773 0.785 0.588 0.587 
F-statistic 32.491 29.306 17.403 17.267 
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tend to have lower costs. Therefore, there is very mixed evidence on the relation between 
performance and governance for the US sample. For the Chinese sample, the evidence simply 
suggests that governance is virtually irrelevant to performance, with the exception of block 
ownership. Since block ownership in China comes primarily in the form of government shares, 
the implication is that government ownership does not enhance performances. 
As a robustness, we include an additional dummy variable that equals one if a firm is 
listed as H share (traded in Hong Kong) or B share (shares restricted to foreigners for our sample 
period), and zero otherwise. This is meant to be a control variable that represents information 
asymmetry. Since H and B shares are mainly held by foreigners, it is expected that firms with B 
or H shares are subject to a lower degree of information asymmetry. The results are shown in the 
appendix, with the variable denoted as share type. The variable itself is largely insignificant; 
however, it appears to somewhat affect other variables, suggesting a multi-collinearity problem. 
This is a problem we hope to address in the future.   
 
6. Conclusions  
In this paper, we present evidence on the relationship between board governance and 
performance using a sample of 74 banks in US and 53 banks in China for the period from 2002 
to 2006.  
We find substantial differences in board structure between the two countries; in particular 
the average board size and the proportion of outside directors for US banks are almost twice of 
those in China. US banks also perform much better than Chinese banks during our sample period. 
As for the relation between performance and governance, the evidence is fairly mixed for the US 
sample while insignificant for the Chinese sample. In particular, in the US sample, board size is 
76 
 
found to be significantly and negatively associated with ROA, but a larger board also tends to 
reduce costs. We cannot identify a satisfactory explanation to reconcile the results for ROA and 
costs. Regarding Chinese banks, the evidence indicates that governance variables are not 
significantly correlated with performances with the exception of block ownership; there is strong 
evidence that block ownership is negatively related to performance. In China, block ownership is 
often government ownership. Therefore, the overall evidence is consistent with our conjecture 
that the role of board governance structure is of secondary importance in Chinese banks, perhaps 
due to the strong role of government.             
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Appendix:  
A robustness check with a dummy variable of share type for Chinese sample: Share Type (it equals to 1 if the bank 
issue B share or H share, 0 otherwise.)  
 
Table i: Regression Analysis - ROA as the Dependent Variable  
The dependent variable is ROA, and the independent variables are board size (column I), the proportion of outside 
directors (II), leadership (III), block ownership proportion (IV), and all four (V). The sample contains 53 Chinese 
banks between 2002 and 2006. Table 1 describes the sample and the variables. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Significance levels: (***) – 1%, (**) -5%, (*) -10%. 
 
ROA  
Governance Variables I II III IV V 
Board Size -0.001* 
   
-0.001 
 
(-1.948) 
   
(0.849) 
Board Size
2
 -0.000 
   
-0.001 
 
(-1.032) 
   
(1.634) 
Independent Directors 
 
0.001 
  
0.001 
  
(0.936) 
  
(1.087) 
Leadership 
  
0.000 
 
0.001* 
   
(1.576) 
 
(2.006) 
Block Ownership 
   
-0.027* -0.017* 
    
(2.146) (2.203) 
Control Variables 
    
lnSize 0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.000 0.001* 
 
(0.603) (2.143) (1.605) (0.306) (0.936) 
GrowOpp -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 
 
(1.305) (1.337) (1.209) (0.920) (1.435) 
CapRatio 0.001 0.002* 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 
(0.457) (1.937) (1.126) (0.049) (1.601) 
Share Type 0.469* 0.152 0.227 0.118 0.789 
 
(1.835) (0.485) (9.847) (0.795) (1.476) 
R
2
 0.793 0.779 0.815 0.845 0.768 
F-statistic 27.325 30.389 32.488 31.315 27.346 
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Table ii: Regression Analysis - Tobin's Q as the Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q, and the independent variables are board size (column I), the 
proportion of outside directors (II), leadership (III), block ownership proportion (IV), and all four (V). 
The sample contains 53 Chinese banks between 2002 and 2006. Table 1 describes the sample and the 
variables. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance levels: (***) – 1%, (**) -5%, (*) -10%. 
 
Tobin's Q 
Governance Variables I II III IV V 
Board Size -0.001 
   
-0.001 
 
(1.268) 
   
(-1.628) 
Board Size
2
 -0.000 
   
-0.001 
 
(1.307) 
   
(0.892) 
Independent Directors 
 
0.001 
  
0.000 
  
(0.347) 
  
(0.385) 
Leadership 
  
0.000 
 
0.001 
   
(0.956) 
 
(0.145) 
Block Ownership 
   
-0.015 -0.013* 
    
(1.038) (2.248) 
Control Variables  
    
lnSize 0.001* 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001* 
 
(2.035) (0.237) (1.168) (0.494) (1.912) 
GrowOpp -0.070 -0.055 -0.032 -0.045 -0.037 
 
(1.286) (1.236) (1.448) (1.028) (0.495) 
CapRatio 0.006 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 
 
(1.638) (1.203) (0.783) (0.449) (0.273) 
Share type 0.067 0.013 0.028 0.031 0.027 
 
(0.483) (0.337) (0.581) (1.006) (0.325) 
R
2
 0.798 0.775 0.874 0.835 0.872 
F-statistic 23.854 24.267 27.331 29.436 25.489 
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Table iii: Regression Analysis - Cost Measure as the Dependent Variable  
The dependent variable is the cost measure, and the independent variables are board size (column I), the 
proportion of outside directors (II), leadership (III), block ownership proportion (IV), and all four (V). The 
sample contains 53 Chinese banks between 2002 and 2006. Table 1 describes the sample and the variables. 
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance levels: (***) – 1%, (**) -5%, (*) -10%. 
 
Cost Measure  
Governance Variables I II III IV V 
Board Size -0.000 
   
0.001 
 
(0.128) 
   
(0.759) 
Board Size
2
 0.001* 
   
0.000 
 
(1.794) 
   
(1.489) 
Independent Directors 
 
-0.001 
  
-0.001 
  
(0.568) 
  
(0.679) 
Leadership 
  
0.003 
 
0.002 
   
(1.564) 
 
(1.703) 
Block Ownership 
   
0.002 0.003* 
    
(0.792) (1.994) 
Control Variables  
    lnSize -0.002* -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.002* 
 
(2.025) (1.668) (0.159) (0.865) (2.104) 
GrowOpp 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 
 
(1.438) (1.486) (0.996) (1.469) (1.736) 
CapRatio -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002  -0.001 
 
(0.214) (0.680) (0.989) (0.138) (0.237) 
Share Type -0.078* 0.028 0.017 0.032 0.016 
 
(1.869) (0.385) (0.447) (0.178) (0.447) 
R
2
 0.798 0.826 0.743 0.760 0.820 
F-statistic 33.860 36.337 27.353 25.187 32.723 
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Table iv: Regression Analysis - Loan Measure as the Dependent Variable  
The dependent variable is the loan measure, and the independent variables are board size (column I), the 
proportion of outside directors (II), leadership (III), block ownership proportion (IV), and all four (V). The 
sample contains 53 Chinese banks between 2002 and 2006. Table 1 describes the sample and the 
variables. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance levels: (***) – 1%, (**) -5%, (*) -10%.  
 
Loan Measure  
Governance Variables I II III IV V 
Board Size 0.001 
   
0.001 
 
(1.132) 
   
(0.487) 
Board Size
2
 0.000 
   
0.002 
 
(1.031) 
   
(0.893) 
Independent Directors 
 
-0.001 
  
-0.000 
  
(0.809) 
  
(0.699) 
Leadership 
  
0.001* 
 
0.002 
   
(1.902) 
 
(1.327) 
Block Ownership 
   
0.000 -0.000 
    
(1.469) (0.141) 
Control Variables  
   lnSize -0.007 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 
 
(0.992) (1.460) (0.799) (1.672) (1.327) 
GrowOpp -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
 
(1.247) (0.795) (0.242) (0.531) (1.164) 
CapRatio 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 
(1.269) (1.007) (0.425) (1.093) (1.248) 
Share Type -0.037 -0.021 -0.009 -0.013* -0.021 
 
(0.348) (0.469) (0.648) (2.206) (1.263) 
R
2
 0.796 0.812 0.783 0.786 0.793 
F-statistic 34.026 31.046 31.903 32.049 28.037 
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Table v: Regression analysis with lagged independent variables 
The table shows regression estimates; the dependent variables are performance variables while the independent 
variables and control variables are lagged values. The sample contains 53 Chinese banks from 2002-2006. Table 1 
describes the sample and the variables. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance levels: (***) – 1%, (**) -
5%, (*) -10%. 
 
Performance Variables  
Governance Variables  ROA Tobin's Q Cost Measure Loan Measure 
Board Size -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 
(1.158) (1.206) (0.993) (1.439) 
Board Size
2
 -0.000* -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
 
(0.229) (1.467) (1.246) (1.348) 
Independent Directors 0.002 0.001 -0.002 -0.000 
 
(1.247) (0.576) (1.326) (1.147) 
Leadership -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 
(1.995) (0.884) (0.802) (1.953) 
Block Ownership -0.002* -0.062 0.003 0.002 
 
(2.109) (1.074) (0.809) (1.137) 
Control Variables 
    lnSize 0.001* 0.001* 0.002 0.002 
 
(1.935) (1.607) (0.894) (1.403) 
GrowOpp -0.006 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 
 
(0.738) (0.993) (1.476) (1.376) 
CapRatio 0.000* 0.001 -0.000 0.001 
 
(2.046) (1.037) (3.019) (1.406) 
Share Type 0.009* 0.003 0.002 0.003 
 
(2.016) (1.038) (1.476) (0.674) 
R
2
 0.796 0.825 0.831 0.802 
F-statistic 30.337 28.402 27.423 29.023 
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